Gender Issues in Population, Health, and Development, Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
This paper is based on a case-study of a community of potters in rural Karnataka in Southern India. It focuses on wife-beating and how it affects caloric allocations within the family using statistical and ethnographic methods. The paper shows that wife-beating is significantly associated with the payement of dowries that are perceived as inadequate. It is also affected by alcohol consumption of males in the family, female sterilization and the number of male children. Furthermore, the children of women who are beaten suffer by being allocated fewer calories than other children with similar characteristics.
Gender Issues in Population, Health, and Development, Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
In this paper, we use data from a retrospective sample survey in rural south-Central India to estimate a model of bride selection and dowry exchange. An important point of this paper is that, since marriages in rural India are arranged by the families of the groom and bride, assortative mating takes place not only on the basis of individual traits (such as beauty, youth and schooling) but also on the basis of parental household characteristics (such as family wealth and father's schooling and occupation). The empirical estimates strongly support the hypothesis of assortative mating on the basis of both individual attributes and family background. However, only two groom characteristics are associated with larger dowries, viz., ownership of wet land by the groom's parental household and schooling of the groom's father. The mutatis mutandis effect of groom height on dowry is actually negative. The empirical results also indicate that, holding groom characteristics constant, there has been a significant increase over time in the age at marriage and schooling of brides, as well as in the amount of dowry exchanged.
This paper uses ethnographic and econometric methods to study the determinants of wife-abuse in a community of potters in Southern India. The qualitative work demonstrates that wife-abuse is more likely when dowries are perceived as inadequate, when husbands are alcoholic, and when the cause of the abuse is perceived as "legitimate" by the community. Hypotheses generated from the qualitative work are tested with survey data which confirms that the risk of wife abuse significantly increases with smaller dowry payments, and alcohol consumption. Furthermore, the statistical analysis reveals that women who are sterilized, and those who have fewer male children, are more likely to be abused.
Keywords: Wife-Abuse, Domestic Violence, Dowry.
Populations around the world have experienced shortages of men at marriageable ages as a result of mortality declines. The resolutions found for this problem vary with the cultural context: declines in the spousal age difference and rises in dowry payments (India) and polygamy (Africa) are two solutions to a disequilibrium in the marriage market.
We hypothesize that in Brazil it is through a mechanism of "recycling" of men through a rise in the formation of highly unstable informal unions, that the marriage market finds its balance. Using census and 1984 survey data, we attempt to establish the relationship between a marriage squeeze and the increase in informal marriage. A logistic analysis of entering a formal or informal marriage provides the final evidence that a marriage squeeze has affected the type of marriage entered.
Dowries in South Asia often amount to over fifty per cent of a household's assets causing widespread destitution among families with daughters to be married. Researchers have noted that this has not always been true and that dowries have steadily risen in most regions of South Asia over the last forty years. This paper attempts to investigate the reasons behind this increase. It adapts Rosen's implicit market model to the Indian marriage market and tests predictions from the model with data from six villages in South - Central India and from the Indian census. It is found that a "marriage squeeze" caused by population growth resulting in larger younger cohorts and hence a surplus of women in the marriage market, has played an important role in the rise in dowries. Other factors influencing the magnitude of dowries include differences in the land holdings of parental households and region of residence.
There are numerous reasons why mortality and life expectancy vary between countries. Epidemiological studies seem to indicate that dietary variations may be among them. A sample of 51 countries studied with data from the ICP and other sources shows that after controlling for nutrient intake, consumption of medical goods and services, income distribution, wheather and literacy, countries with more meat and vegetables in their diet have lower life expectancies after age five. The results for infant mortality and child death between one and five indicate that a more animal intensive diet may actually be more beneficial, especially if fish consumption is increased and poultry consumption reduced.
This paper, based upon a case-study of three villages in South India, uses qualitative and quantitative data to study whether households within the same market pay different prices for identical goods. It is found that not only are unit prices for food heterogeneous, but that the poor pay more for the same goods than the rich. This is because liquidity constraints force poorer households to purchase goods in small quantities and consequently subject them to quantity premiums. Household specific index numbers are calculated to measure this price heterogeneity and are used to adjust nominal incomes to real values. It is found that Gini coefficients of real incomes are between 12% to 23% greater than the Gini for nominal incomes depending upon the price index used. An econometric analysis of the determinants of prices shows that incomes are negatively correlated with prices, as is family size, but that the amount of land owned shows a positive relationship. All of these effects are consistent with a quantity premium explanation. Quantity effects are directly estimated by OLS and IV for all prices, and are found to be particularly acute for pulses and legumes which are the primary sources of protein in India.
This paper examines how domestic violence may be used by a husband as an instrument to extract larger transfers from his wife's family. It is based on a case-study conducted by the authors of three villages in Southern India. We develop a simple model of bargaining between the families of the husband and the wife where violence can be used to shift the wife's utility level in case of disagreement. The predictions from this model are tested with survey data. We find that women who pay smaller dowries suffer an increased risk of marital violence, as do women who come from wealthier families.
In India, as in much of the developing world, a tubal ligation is a public event -- a woman cannot hide the fact that she has had the procedure from her family and social circle. It is also, effectively, irreversible. These two characteristics distinguish sterilization from other methods of contraception. Our contention is that these properties, in combination with cultural and economic forces existent in Indian society, may make women who undergo tubal ligations suffer a loss of status and power that places them at enhanced risk of physical and mental assault. We draw upon qualitative and statistical evidence from two communities in India to make our case. The statistical analysis of survey data from a Karnataka community reveals a significant association between sterilization and abuse of women after controlling for dowry payments, socio-economic status, duration of the marriage and the age and sex-composition of children. Anthropological work conducted in the neighboring state of Maharashtra reveals that women who are sterilized are prone to accusations of infidelity, a drop in status within the family caused by an early end to their ability to bear children. Interviews conducted in Karnataka further reveal a loss of interest in sex after sterilization. All of this leaves women more vulnerable to physical and emotional abuse. Furthermore, our work suggests that the sterilization - wife-abuse nexus may result in a variety of gynecological problems like fatigue, pelvic pain and excess bleeding.
This paper analyzes a model of statistical discrimination where members of the minority group can choose to adopt a social behavior identified with the dominant group. This social behavior, even though it is unrelated to productivity, can be used as a screening device by employers. In equilibrium, high productivity minority workers choose to assimilate with the dominant group while low productivity minority workers are further isolated from the mainstream.
A fair amount of theoretical work has attempted to incorporate social factors into formal economic models, but few economists have attempted to test whether such "social consumption" matters. In this paper, I test if there are compensating differentials associated with the prestige of an occupation in the context of the Indian caste system.
The caste system divides a community into hierarchical strata whose rank order is determined, largely, by ritual "purity". All individuals are born into a particular caste which is associated with a traditional occupation. If individuals gain Utility from being in the more prestigious traditional occupation of a higher-ranked caste, theory predicts that some individuals, when choosing an occupation, will tradeoff the income generated by the occupation for its prestige value.
The theory is tested with panel data on rural households spread over ten villages in the semi-arid tropics of India. Strong compensating differentials for prestige mobility are found, treating it as an endogenous variable, indicating that at least in these communities, individuals value the social prestige inherent within an occupation.
(Revised version of "Marital Instability, Inter-Spouse Bargaining and their Implications for Fertility in Brazil," Discussion Paper Series OSC (PRC) 91-3, Population Research Center, University of Chicago). (Revised and resubmitted Economic Development and Cultural Change).
This paper employs both ethnographic methods with field interviews conducted in Brazil in early 1990, and econometric methods with an analysis of the 1984 PNAD (.5% survey of Brazilian households) survey to examine the impact of marital instability and spousal bargaining on fertility in Brazil. The work develops a bargaining model of fertility, based on Nash-bargaining models of decision-making within households.
It is found that women who have higher threats of divorce, as measured by the unearned incomes of husband and wife, the relative availability of alternative mates, and the relative possibilities of employment in the labor force, bear fewer children. These threats of divorce areaccentuated in consensual unions which have lower "costs" of divorce since they do not have to contend with either the church or the state.