

**Elites, Regimes, and Growth Machines:  
The Politics of Parks Development in Chicago and  
London**

by

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## Introduction

Social scientists have studied the nature of politics in urban areas for several decades, especially focusing on the relationship between politics and development. Various theories have described the policy-making process in cities as dominated by public/private regimes, elite actors, dispersed interest groups, or more recently growth machines (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995). The city as a growth machine theory addresses the development process in particular, and argues urban governments and private actors have growth as their central goal—whether economic, infrastructure, or population. This description of the urban decision-making structure as a public-private growth regime has been popular in urban literature for years and has been used to explain political outcomes in many cities. However, recently some authors have observed contrary trends, such as the increasing influence of neighborhood groups (Ferman 1996).

Both Chicago and London, two of the world's most important financial and cultural centers, experienced long periods of industrialization early in their histories, followed by a decline in the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century and rebirth in the late 20<sup>th</sup> to early 21<sup>st</sup> century. They have also experienced a recent resurgence of park development, an urban amenity important to the citizens and governments of both cities for many years. However, despite these similarities, Chicago and London have many differences in their political cultures, histories, and modern government structures. It is remarkable that both produced have recently produced similar policy outcomes—the use of open space as a major development project—under such distinct circumstances. Millennium Park in Chicago and the 2012 Olympic Park in

London serve as the most internationally notable and locally important development projects for these cities in the last several decades. Millennium Park is driving a tourism, culture, and construction boom in the central Loop area, and London's Olympic Park is expected to economically and socially integrate east London into the rest of the capital. Parks are generally seen as serene places for residents to enjoy nature, not tools of development regimes. Growth machine driven urban development usually takes the form of commercial, industrial, or residential spaces, not open space. However, Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park appear to have merged these forces in Chicago and London.

For these reasons both sites make fascinating case studies of possible new trends in the politics of urban development in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, and may help add to the growing body of knowledge on urban political theory. Are cities dominated by regimes, elite actors, political machines, or growth coalitions? Or have interest and community groups gained access to the government and been able to influence policy in their neighborhoods or issue areas? What do these parks reveal about the nature of urban governance and development at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century? If the nature of urban governance has changed, and does not fit with the predictions of current political theory, how can it be modified to account for these changes? How have the political culture, society, and population of these cities changed as well? What has precipitated these changes? Also, what is their significance? If these trends are positive, and parks development is seen as a good, how can concerned actors harness similar processes in order to produce these outcomes? If they represent negative trends, how can the development process be more inclusive? Finally, what directions

can future study take in the investigation of urban politics and development in order to better understand and improve urban governance to promote economy, environment, and quality of life?

In order to answer these questions I developed an analytical framework that accounts for the different political aspects of the urban development process. In addition to growth machine theory, this framework includes other theories that provide descriptions of the urban political process. Regime theory, elite theory, pluralist theory, and electoral theory have all been used to describe how policy is made. Although these theories can stand on their own, there is also a significant amount of overlap between them. I do not try to pinpoint only one theory that describes these political outcomes. Rather, I compare their descriptions of urban politics to assess their relative power in explaining the political process behind parks development.

In order to make this process of analysis and comparison stronger, I have created four different categories to describe the full scope of the development process. These categories are dominant actors/concentration of power, primary goals, resources used, and pathways of influence. Although these do not account for every aspect of the process, they provide a way to systematically analyze the core components of development. In my evaluation matrix (Chapter 2), I describe what each of these theories would predict for each category. This matrix allows for a precise assessment of the development process in Chicago and London. After this analysis of each case study, I have compared the cases to each other based on these

criteria, including a semi-quantitative analysis. This produces a better understanding of how well each theory explains the outcome in each category.

Overall I have found that the political process behind parks development in Chicago and London demonstrates that the nature of urban policy-making and development has changed in distinct ways. First, these sustainable and environmental projects reflect pluralist goals, but do not indicate the presence of a pluralist system of government. Each project sought to improve urban quality of life but limited the access of neighborhood and interest groups. Second, classical growth coalitions did not dominate these projects, but the new coalitions of elite actors rely on similar resources—private business funding and top level political power—and have similar goals—economic and infrastructure growth—as before. In addition, the process in both cases was driven by a regime of elite actors—using their mutual strength to pursue personal and shared goals— especially in terms of the concentration of power and pathways of influence. Finally, both projects were overseen and shaped by strong, charismatic, independent, environmentally committed mayors—Richard Daley in Chicago and Ken Livingstone in London.

Based on these conclusions, I propose a comprehensive political theory, which I term the “Green Development Regime”. It describes the nature of urban politics I have observed in Chicago and London, based on my case studies, and seeks to add another theoretical tool for researchers to interpret politics and development in other cities. In addition, I analyze how my conclusions relate to the observations of several recent studies and trends described in the popular media. Overall the conclusions I have derived from my case studies begin to shed greater light on the chaotic nature of

modern urban politics. Cities are some of the most interesting locations to study politics, particularly because they are so diverse and deal with a wide range of social, environmental, cultural, and economic problems. These factors also make it vital to understand cities—especially those rapidly expanding and in the developing world—in order to govern them in an effective and equitable manner and improve quality of life.

## Chapter One: Studying the Politics of Chicago and London

### Why Chicago?

Even since its early days as a major industrial and transportation hub, dominated by railroads, grain, and meatpacking, the people of Chicago saw themselves as having a unique connection to the natural world. It eventually became known as *Nature's Metropolis*—a city where market activity thrived but did not overwhelm every aspect of life—and a place where open space and parks were just as important as factories and buildings (Cronon 1992). Daniel Burnham's 1909 *Plan for Chicago* outlined these ideals in a concrete manner, designing a city landscape dominated by public gathering places (Burnham and Bennett 1909). Throughout the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, when the Democratic Party came to define Chicago more than anything else, this plan met with varying degrees of success and failure. Richard J. Daley presided over the machine as mayor for 22 years from 1955-76, Jane Byrne and Harold Washington provided some opposition in the 80s, and Richard M. Daley has held the position since 1989 (Green and Holli 1995).

Contrary to expectations, in the nearly two decades since his initial election Daley has overseen—and in many cases engineered—the dramatic rise of sustainable environmental policy and development in his city. In particular, his administration has worked with groups such as the Trust for Public Land, as well as major corporate interests, to revitalize many run-down industrial or commercial sites as open space development—both enormous projects and small neighborhood parks. Many have viewed these changes as, “a global model for how a metropolis can pursue environmental goals to achieve economic success” (Schneider 2006). Cities around

the country have experienced similar trends, or if they have not yet, contain a sizable amount of political will wanting to implement sustainable development policy. Unlike most of them, however, Chicago has seen the powerful influence of green, open space actors in the planning process for many years (Burnham and Bennett 1909). The city's motto—"urbs in horto" (city in a garden)—has called for the presence of open space in the central city throughout Chicago's history, but it has not typically been backed by such a strong mayor. Chicago provides a unique case study because of this combination of a seemingly unchanged political regime, but an apparent transformation of mayoral goals away from growth and towards green ideals. It also serves as an example, since many other cities, including Boston, New York, and Seattle experienced similar environmental trends in the last decade (Underwood 2006).

### **Why London?**

Another postindustrial city, London, England, has also recently experienced a growth in the prevalence of open space and sustainable development on the city's political agenda. Although London has several enormous and historic parks in the central city, for many years it was known as a polluted, crowded, environmentally uninviting place to live. Like many other industrial cities around the world, London saw a decline in population throughout the mid-to-late twentieth century as many individuals, families, and businesses moved outwards from the center. This led to an explosion of population, jobs, and economic development in the areas surrounding London, and an overall decline in the amount of city residents (Travers 2004). However, from the abolishment of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986 until

the late 1990s, the capital experienced a period of economic and population rebirth. The city has struggled over the past several years, since the establishment of the new Greater London Authority in 2000, to direct this growth in manner that provides the greatest benefit to all residents. They want to avoid the post-industrial problems that led to the city's decline and address the increasing inequality between residents. Led by Mayor Ken Livingstone, this had produced an explosion of environmental and sustainable development projects on city and national government agendas. Livingstone believes the defining example of these will be London's hosting of the 2012 Olympics (Mayor of London). The Olympic project will leave behind an urban park in East London as the centerpiece of economic rebirth in the region. This represents a new growth style for the city that—unlike Chicago—is the product of a new system of government juxtaposing city and national power.

### **Chicago and London: two case studies**

London represents a unique political case study but also one that provides excellent contrast to Chicago. Although it has experienced similar environmental trends in the last decade, London has a much different political history, infrastructure, and relationship between national and city government. While Chicago has enjoyed a long period of stability under one mayor, London's political environment remains novel. In addition, the city does not have Daniel Burnham's planning history, forcing Livingstone to draw on other sources for inspiration. The key remains that these diverse systems of government—each representing a structure common in many other locations—have produced similar policy outcomes. Analyzing the similarities and differences will contribute to an overall assessment of how these outcomes represent

trends in urban politics and development on a global scale. Many cities, particularly those in developing countries, are struggling with similar (re)development problems. Understanding the nature of urban governance in these successful cities will help groups interested in pursuing sustainable development achieve their goals.

### **Central question(s)**

Although these recent open space projects have incorporated environmental ideals, they have also created significant economic and political benefits for the groups involved in creating them. Clearly these different parks are the outcome of a definite political process. The question remains, what explains the use of parks as major urban development projects in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century? Do these outcomes represent the growing influence of neighborhood and interest groups? Do they reflect the strength of powerful mayors and politicians responding to the public will? Do the economic benefits of this land-use point to continued dominance of the urban growth machine? If no theory can explain the new green development policies in Chicago and London, how does the framework need to be altered in order to reconcile these political outcomes?

### **Methodology**

Overall the goal of this study is to determine what the use of parks as major urban developments reveals about the nature of urban politics in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Similar to past urban politics studies, I will use a case study approach to this problem. Choosing two case studies is effective because it allows for a direct comparison for many different variables. The two case studies I have chosen are Chicago's Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park. They are similar in many

respects, particularly the large scale and importance of the projects, as well as the oversight by powerful, charismatic mayors. However, the governance systems that generated these outcomes are very different, making it vital to understand how the political process produced these similar projects. Since most urban political theory has come out of an analysis of US cities, many scholars have recognized the importance of extending it around the world. I have paid close attention to many of their suggestions for a successful trans-national comparison, making sure to look at institutional and cultural factors that distinguish my two case studies.

Previous studies that use this case approach either develop theory from the description of a process or compare outcomes to the predictions of previous theory. Since urban political theory has an extensive body of knowledge, I have chosen the second approach and developed an evaluation matrix described in the next chapter. It compares five major political theories on four different criteria that allow for their distinction, as well as outlining their predictions for each criterion. At the end of each case study I compare it to predictions of this matrix, and in the final chapter I compare them to each other. In addition, I have conducted a semi-quantitative analysis that describes how well each theory explains the outcomes across criteria. Finally, I have used this description of the process to develop my own explanatory theory.

This methodology is based on previous studies but has been formulated to suit my comparison. Instead of just testing and qualifying one theory, I have incorporated other theories, extending the work of other authors who have sought to do the same. Barbara Ferman (1996) incorporated pluralist theory into her analysis of growth

machine coalitions in Pittsburgh and Chicago, while I seek to also incorporate elite and electoral theories, which I believe can shed light on the urban political process. My semi-quantitative ranking contributes to my goal of developing a comprehensive theory based on my case studies. Some authors believe that the heavy reliance on and alteration of regime theory has rendered it useless (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). Instead of framing my conclusions as a modification of regime analysis, my use of multiple theories and evaluation matrix allow me to develop a unique theory that draws from a wider body of theoretical knowledge and does not dilute existing theory.

In order to compare the predictions of each theory, I plan to use urban political theory lenses applied to previous case studies. However, they have rarely been applied to the planning of urban parks. First I provide background on the literature I use as the basis for this analysis in three areas: urban planning and politics, Chicago and London politics, and finally parks and open space planning. For these topics I have attempted to provide a comprehensive overview with a focus on Chicago and London's urban parks. For each body of literature I cover the major secondary sources. That is followed by an overview of each case study, including history, relevant actors, financing, and the final product. My evidence for the Chicago section primarily includes Timothy Gilfoyle's book, *Millennium Park*, which gives a comprehensive overview of the entire planning process. In addition, I have used many of Gilfoyle's primary source interviews of the relevant actors involved in the project, deposited at the Chicago History Museum. For Chicago, I also consulted the Chicago Tribune and other city newspapers extensively to get an idea of how the

media perceived the project. I also spent time at the Harold Washington Library looking over election results and annual reports from the Chicago Park District. For London, I spent six weeks in the summer of 2006 attending meetings and conducting semi-structured interviews with people involved in the project. In particular I determine the positions of different organizations, where the funding came from, electoral results, and how the parks will affect the area around their development. I have paid close attention to the different actors in the process, the language they use to articulate goals, and the pathways used to influence policy outcomes. This will give me an accurate picture of what theory best explains these recent developments. I have selected two case studies that represent diverse government styles, but ones that have produced similar development outcomes

**Table 1: Millennium Park Methodology**

<b>Interviews (conducted by Timothy Gilfoyle)</b>	<b>Newspaper/ Magazine Articles</b>	<b>Primary Sources (literature)</b>	<b>Secondary Sources (literature)</b>	<b>Secondary Sources (internet)</b>
-Ed Uhlir -Richard Daley -Michael Lasch -Marshall Field V -Paul Gray -Sandra Guthman -Lawrence O. Booth -Robert Hutchinson -Donna LaPietra -John McDonough -Joan Harris -Randall Mehrberg -George A. Ranney -Lois Weisberg	-Chicago Tribune -Chicago Sun-Times -Chicago Defender -Economist -Vancouver Sun -New York Times -Newsweek -Metropolis Magazine -South China Morning Post	-URS Corporation: Millennium Park Economic Impact Study -Daniel Burnham: Plan for Chicago -Chicago Park District Annual Reports -Friends of the Parks Annual Reports -US Census data -Election results (Harold Washington library)	-Gilfoyle: Millennium Park -Simpson: The New Daley Machine -Simpson: Rogues, Rebels, and Rubber Stamps -Johnson: Chicago Metropolis 2020 -Fremon: Chicago Politics Ward by Ward -Green and Holli: The Mayors	-Neighborhood Capital Budget Group -Millennium Park -Public Buildings Commission -Chicago Park District -Metropolitan Planning Council -Friends of the Parks -Trust for Public Land -Urban Land Institute -Great Cities Institute

**Table 2: London's Olympic Park Methodology**

<b>Semi-Structured Interviews/ Site Visits</b>	<b>Newspaper/ Magazine Articles</b>	<b>Primary Sources (literature)</b>	<b>Secondary Sources (literature)</b>	<b>Secondary Sources (internet)</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-London Sustainability Exchange</li> <li>-London Architecture Biennale</li> <li>-Mayor's Question Time sessions</li> <li>-Transport for London Board meeting</li> <li>-University of East London</li> <li>-Newham Striders Olympic Park tour</li> <li>-Creative Links EXPO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Telegraph</li> <li>-London Times</li> <li>-Guardian</li> <li>-Evening Standard</li> <li>-New York Times</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-London 2012 Sustainable Development Strategy</li> <li>-DCMS Regulatory Impact Assessment</li> <li>-LDA Annual Report</li> <li>-London Plan Early Alterations</li> <li>-BBC Olympics survey</li> <li>-Pricewaterhouse Coopers Olympic Impact Study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Travers: Governing the Ungovernable City</li> <li>-Leeson: What would be the Environmental Impact of a 2012 London Olympics?</li> <li>-Poynter: From Beijing to Bow Bells</li> <li>-Cohen and Macrury: Carrying the Torch for East London 2012</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-BBC Sport</li> <li>-British Olympic Association</li> <li>-London 2012 (press releases)</li> <li>-10 Downing Street</li> <li>-ITV</li> <li>-Loyalty Management Group</li> <li>-Mayor of London</li> <li>-Department of Culture, Media, and Sport</li> <li>-LDA</li> <li>-Games Monitor</li> </ul>

**Table 3: Literature Review**

<b>Chicago</b>	<b>London</b>	<b>Parks Planning</b>	<b>Urban Political Theory</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Spirou and Bennett: It's Hardly Sportin'</li> <li>-see table 1</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-BBC news website</li> <li>-see table 2</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Walker: The Public Value of Urban Parks</li> <li>-Garvin: Parks and Recreation, a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Agenda</li> <li>-Cranz: The Politics of Park Design</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Logan and Molotch: City as a Growth Machine</li> <li>-Dahl: Who Governs?</li> <li>-Ferman: Challenging the Growth Machine</li> <li>-Judge, Stoker, and Wolman: Theories of Urban Politics</li> <li>-Clark: City as an Entertainment Machine</li> <li>-Clark: The New Political Culture</li> <li>-While, Jonas, and Gibbs: Urban Sustainability Fix</li> <li>-other journal articles</li> </ul>

**Where does this study fit?**

Although some have attempted to account for the environmental movement in growth machine studies, parks are not normally studied as major urban development (While, Jonas and Gibbs 2004). In addition, Chicago and London are both important world cities with unique, definite political cultures and histories, but also with processes that can translate to other urban areas. Park development is common in urban land use, yet it has received miniscule treatment in urban political theory literature. The analysis presented in this thesis not only advances thinking in this field, but also provides a unique environmental perspective to traditional growth machine studies. In addition, with so much of the world's population living in urban

areas and the number growing every day, understanding urban political processes will help planners design cities that meet residents' needs. Most importantly, open space developments such as parks can help alleviate urban health, social, and economic problems, despite the opposition of some residents. This thesis also illuminates how other cities can achieve similar success in open space development as Chicago and London have done over the past few years.

### **Urban political theory: still dominated by growth machines?**

Over the past thirty years scholars have developed a variety of interconnected frameworks to explain urban policy outcomes. One of the most recent, and intriguing, is the theory of the city as a growth machine: the proponents arguing that coalitions of real estate developers, businesses, and politicians direct development and land use in order to obtain the greatest economic benefit from a given area (Molotch 1976, 309). They argue that this is the sole goal and purpose of urban planning and politics. Critics such as Barbara Ferman have pointed to projects initiated or blocked by community groups, and the increasing strength of anti-growth environmental ideals, to refute these ideas and suggest a model of urban government that includes these groups. Four other major theories—pluralism, regime, elite, and electoral theory—provide alternative frameworks for explaining policy outcomes of the urban political process. Pluralism proposes that city politics are defined by fragmentation and the influence of a variety of different actors in different spheres (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995). Instead of a central business elite or coalition controlling all decisions, NGOs and community groups have access to government actors. Regime theorists argue that policy outcomes are the product of a dual

dependency and control between business elites—the central focus of growth machine theory—and city officials. Regime theory borrows from both growth machine theory and pluralist theory in developing its analytical tools (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995). In the same vein as pluralism, however, some theorists contend that powerful interest and neighborhood groups can form a central element of urban regimes. This regime is primarily concerned with maintaining its power. In addition, elite theory presents the idea that one single, powerful actor or a small group can have a dominant influence on the policy process. They rely on reputation, charisma, and access to top levels of government and business. Finally, electoral theory points to the desire for re-election as providing the explanation for policy outcomes. This is similar to classic machine politics where political parties back candidates and when elected they deliver patronage. These theories both overlap and provide a wide range of prediction, functioning as a baseline to which a diverse range of political outcomes can be compared. These five lenses—growth machine theory, pluralist theory, regime theory, elite theory, and electoral theory—have formed the backbone of many political case studies, but have not looked at the increase of sustainable ideals in urban developments such as parks.

Theorists have struggled for years to find a comprehensive lens that can explain urban political outcomes, but the extremely diverse range of private, public, NGOs, and individuals that make up global city landscapes precludes a single explanation. In recent years growth machine theory in particular has found a wide range of applications. Its main focus lies in the process of development, dividing citizens into two groups: the *rentiers*—those who benefit from and seek to maximize

the exchange value of land—and people who benefit from land only in its value as living or working space (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995). In the past, these *rentiers* and their high-rise apartments, hotels, major cultural institutions, and commercial centers have, according to growth machine theorists, been supported by an alliance with the major decision-makers in city government. In their view, this mutually beneficial relationship between business and government—combined with the desire by powerful groups to get the greatest economic benefit out of urban land—provides the sole focus of political actions and explains most policy outcomes.

Some growth machine theorists, however, such as Ferman, have incorporated neighborhood and special interest groups into their analyses, even though they remain outside the traditional coalition of real estate, business, and political interests. According to Ferman, in her book *Challenging the Growth Machine* (1996), the primacy of the institution of electoral politics in Chicago causes neighborhood groups to clash with government, and ultimately lose out in the planning process. In Pittsburgh they have succeeded in influencing the growth machine, however, often having a strong voice in development decisions. Ferman (1996) traces the evolution of these trends through every Chicago mayoral administration from mid-20<sup>th</sup> century to Harold Washington's death in 1987. Although several reform mayors reigned during this time period, only Washington made any progress in the fight for community based—in Chicago, often racial or ethnic—organizations against the growth machine. Overall, Ferman (1996) argues that neighborhood groups in Chicago clash with the urban regime, having little influence in the planning process.

## **Literature Review**

In addition to the five lenses of urban planning and political theory, this analysis relies on the extensive history of Chicago and London political literature as well as the value and planning of urban parks. Providing a brief overview of the trend of government interactions as well as the Chicago and London-specific planning processes and new trends in urban parks development allows for a more accurate application of theory.

### **Chicago political history**

Dick Simpson (2001), a former reform alderman who fought many long and contentious battles with the current mayor's father, Richard J. Daley, once wrote, "Crooks and saints, hacks and reformers, ordinary and extraordinary elected officials have fought their political battles in the Chicago City Council." Chicago has a history of political literature almost as rich as the tradition of politics itself. Simpson (2001) analyzed the City Council as an urban regime with characteristic, "institutional framework, political culture, and spheres of activities." Simpson (2001) also analyzes the Council in the context of electoral theory, arguing that the powerful city interests try to mold elections that determine the council regime, which interacts with the mayor to produce public policies. An idealistic view of urban government holds that city interests will be pluralist, elections will be contested, the Council will be fragmented—not always supporting the mayor—and public policies will be in the public's best interest. Throughout the course of the last half-century, from Richard J. Daley to Richard M., Simpson (2001) traces the path of the Council through phases: "growth machine", "rubber-stamp", "progressive regime", and finally the current

“New Chicago Machine”. Simpson finds distinct differences that help explain the Council’s political outcomes during each time period. He argues that the nature of Chicago politics serves as an excellent indicator for other cities around the country, describing it as, “...an extreme example of American culture”, and an, “...extreme example of American politics”, that, “...reveals an often hidden side of our country”, serving as, “...a window on our larger American civilization” (Simpson 2001).

Understanding political outcomes under Richard M. Daley in Chicago requires an overview of the policy-making process, the history and tradition, and the true power brokers in the city. The city government consists of a powerful mayor, elected every four years, as well as a fifty-member City Council, with one member elected from each of fifty wards in the city that are redistricted every ten years (Fremon 1988). The City Council serves as the legislative body for Chicago, with political outcomes in the past mostly the product of patronage, cronyism, and corruption, which have nationally become synonymous with Chicago politics. Each Ward has characteristic ethnicities and voting patterns, but the Democratic Party has controlled Chicago for many years. Each ward also has the position of Democratic committeeman, the person responsible in the past for doling out patronage funds and jobs (Fremon 1988). From 1955 to 1976 Richard J. Daley presided over a “rubber-stamp” council that served its purpose of supporting Democratic wards and party members, although some conflict has always existed. Simpson points to growth machine theory to explain many of the first Daley’s political outcomes. The period between 1976 and 1989 consisted of chaos in Chicago’s city government, as it did in many other cities around the country. From 1976-9 Michael Bilandic struggled with

rapid economic decline as well as increasing racial and social tension. Jane Byrne defeated Bilandic in the Democratic primary in 1979, the only election that really mattered in Chicago, ruling until Harold Washington took over in 1983. She created major rifts in the Democratic political machine, fought with new Council factions, and endured growing discontent in the African American community, the primary group responsible for Washington's election. Since his election 1983, Washington and his successor Eugene Sawyer continuously fought to bring progressive ideals to Chicago politics, with some major victories, but ultimately "Council Wars and Chaos" characterized the period (Simpson 2001). Richard M. Daley ushered in a "Return to Mayoral Control" after defeating Sawyer and many others in a contentious 1989 Democratic primary. Since then he has increased his base of support and widened his margin of victory with every election, along with presiding over dramatic changes in Chicago's government.

One significant change has been economic and population decline in the 1980s and 1990s, leaving the city, "vulnerable to policies emanating from Springfield [state government] and Washington, D.C." (Green and Holli 1995). Paul Green (1995) argues that this has caused Mayor Daley to serve as an, "unabashed economic booster", and claims that any successor, "will either need a vast influx of new revenue from new sources or help from the state or national government." The New Chicago Machine, "dismisses party organization as being out of date, and sees improved economics as the key to community life" (Green and Holli 1995). In the context of parks development, these political, economic, and racial changes to Chicago's ruling coalition go a long way towards explaining recent policy outcomes.

## **London political history**

Although London also has an extensive and ever-changing political history that dates back much longer than Chicago, it is useful to focus on the literature over the last few decades. These trends fit into a dynamic political context, as in the last twenty years London's system of government has changed several times. The complexity of London and this ever-changing political climate has caused one author to title their book on the city's politics *Governing the Ungovernable City* (Travers 2004). Instead of a long standing political machine, London's history over the past 30 years has been characterized by instability. Tension has always existed between the people of London and the rest of England, a product of the city's international stature, and because of this the Government has continually tried to strike a balance between national and local control. Boroughs, small semi-autonomous governmental units, have taken charge of local public services in London for most of the city's history. Some of the larger ones have budgets in the hundreds of millions of pounds, operating essentially as small cities do in the United States, with an elected council and leadership in charge of local administration and distribution of public services. Since they are close to the people, and historically protective of their autonomy, borough governments have often resisted a more comprehensive public government for London. Understanding the current situation under the Greater London Authority requires keeping in mind these three norms: the presence of a semi-autonomous city-wide planning body, the presence of autonomous and powerful borough government, and the resistance of the national government to delegate power to the city of London. However, as the population and complexity of the city grew and sprawled outwards

once again during the 1990s, the national government began to realize the magnitude of the democratic deficit in London and the necessity of creating a coordinating body. With pressing environmental, social, and spatial planning concerns weighing on the national government, they realized that delegating this power was vital to the continued progress of London from the struggles of a postindustrial city to a “world city”. Previous governing bodies had failed to direct and control growth in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, so a new solution was sought (Travers 2004).

To give some historical background for this decision, from 1965 until 1986 the Greater London Council (GLC) presided over transportation and set long term planning strategy for the city as a whole. Since the GLC was primarily intended as a strategic body to complement the administrative power of the boroughs, “it was always a weak authority” (Travers 2004). The GLC came to a contentious end when the Government of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative party abolished it in 1986. Ken Livingstone, now the powerful Mayor of the Greater London Authority, presided over the GLC in its later years, at which time he was known as a radical liberal and a member of the Labour Party. Many would argue that his pursuit of liberal policies led Thatcher to disband the GLC. Although the GLC had made some progress towards improving public transportation and challenging some national government policies, “...nothing in the Livingstone GLC’s short life became it so much as the leaving it” (Travers 2004). After the GLC was abolished some services were devolved to borough councils, while a few government-appointed boards continued to set urban policy in education, transportation, and the environment for London. These bodies had no significant coordination or power outside of purely

administrative necessity, however. During the bizarre intermediate period, London began to experience a period of economic and population growth, including an unprecedented influx of immigrants and the explosion of the financial services sector. By the late 1990s the city began to feel the pressure of this rebirth. Business and planning authorities had begun to collaborate on city-wide development projects, seeking to elevate London economically to the status of a “global city”, which they succeeded in large part in doing. The boroughs began to become more cohesive as well through the development of the Association of London Governments. However, aside from the wealth at the top, the rest of London’s citizens suffered from the disbanding of the GLC. Residents blamed the lack of city government for, “a variety of urban ills, including deteriorating quality of life, poorer public services, increased homelessness, and growing inequality” (Travers 2004). The national government began to realize that the city was heading in a familiar direction as in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, and in the late 1990s it began to develop a plan for a new city government. After opening up the plan to public comment, obtaining input from local authorities, and creating the largest government act since the 1935 Government of India Act, the Government established a new central authority, the GLA, which held its first citywide elections in 2000. A public referendum preceded the official passage, and the results revealed that about two thirds of London’s citizens supported the plan, with some boroughs receiving up to an 80% positive vote. The GLA, under the direction of the Mayor, has authority over public transportation, strategic planning, and major public services in the capital (Travers 2004).

The plan gave the Mayor greater executive authority than any previous city plan for London, making the 2000 elections very important to the future of the city. The structure of the GLA gives the Mayor power to appoint members of the London Development Agency, the main strategic planning authority, as well as chair and appoint members of the Transport for London board, among other public services. This authority is unprecedented for any executive in London, and the first few years have served as a grand experiment. London's government has finally caught up with most of the rest of the world in terms of authority, although it still lags behind many cities in the US. Ken Livingstone's 2000 election demonstrated that party politics, so dominant in national elections, would not have the same sway over city government.

Livingstone split with his former Labour party before the elections, and ran his campaign in a modern, individual style. His election reflects his personal power, including his respect and status in global politics. Livingstone has governed London in a similar fashion to Daley in Chicago. He has appointed members of his various boards in typical fashion, surrounding himself with allies but also seeking out leaders in important fields above politics. He has frequently enforced a commitment to sustainability, the environment, and open space, particularly through his London Plan—the first long term planning effort in decades—as well as his Congestion Charging scheme to make drivers pay to enter the central city. Livingstone has made solving the problem of climate change central to his agenda and making London a sustainable city a goal that overrides all of his policy decisions. Overall the first six years of the GLA, and its structure, represent a major change in the way London politics and planning operates. The contentious political history has given way to a

strong central authority, making it much more similar to Chicago. Analyzing how the new government structure has affected the planning and development process will help constrain the nature of urban politics in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Parks planning literature**

The final body of literature is not nearly as contentious as politics in Chicago or London, but understanding the theory, process, and effects of the parks planning process will be vital to analyzing political outcomes. In 2004 Christopher Walker of the Urban Institute wrote a paper entitled “The Public Value of Urban Parks” that summarizes both the conventional arguments as well as new reasoning for the benefits of parks in city centers. He first describes the traditional view, that they simply provide open space and recreational facilities, but also cites recent literature that finds a link between open space and property values. One found that, “the value of properties near Pennypack Park in Philadelphia increased from about \$1,000 per acre at 2,500 feet from the park to \$11,500 per acre at 45 feet from the park” (Walker 2004). The view of parks as a strong influence on neighborhood quality has also grown in popularity, but the main new arguments are that parks provide positive youth experiences, including work, improve the health of a community, and build social capital among local residents (Walker 2004). The nature of urban open space has also seen a variety of new trends in the last decade, with planners striving to find creative and unique ways to provide downtown parks. Alexander Garvin’s “Parks, Recreation, and Open Space: A Twenty-First Century Agenda” (2000) encourages many of these ideas, including riverfront parks, greenways, incorporating parks into pedestrian corridors, and using parks as “green roofs” for parking garages of

downtown buildings. Chicago and London parks have incorporated a number of these current trends in parks development, particularly the use of parks as green roofs and the combination park/school to encourage youth work and development.

### **Chicago parks history**

The parks planning process is not the same in all cities, but Chicago has a process similar to other urban areas. The Chicago Park District (CPD) is the primary parks planning and management organization, and one of the most powerful bodies in city government. The quasi-public Park District oversees 7300 acres of green space that includes over 500 parks, in 2006 had a total operating budget of over 366 million dollars, and raised approximately 250 million dollars in property tax revenues as an independent taxing agency (CPD Annual Reports). In both total budget and per-capita spending the Chicago Park District is among the largest in the country, exceeded only in total expenditures by New York City (Center for City Park Excellence). Although the CPD is an extremely powerful and political organization, the urban planning—specifically parks planning—process in Chicago has several other major players, besides of course the Mayor and City Council. Non-profit organizations such as Friends of the Parks, a CPD watchdog organization, engage in lobbying, policy analysis, and oversight of the notoriously patronage-heavy body—although some claim Daley has cleaned it up (Friends of the Parks). The Metropolitan Planning Council of Chicago is another powerful non-profit organization that works with the city government, as is the Commercial Club of Chicago (Metropolitan Planning Council). The latter commissioned both Daniel Burnham's original *Plan for Chicago* as well as a new study entitled *Chicago*

*Metropolis 2020* that focuses primarily on poverty, education, and transportation (Johnson 2001). Planning also has input from government organizations such as the Chicago Transit Authority, and, in some cases, a variety of private businesses, foundations, and individuals, including the newly powerful Trust for Public Land. On the surface the parks process appears to be dominated by one major management organization that has a history of patronage and corruption but also outstanding success. However, the pluralist model includes many neighborhood and non-profit groups seeking influence. Parks planning in Chicago has a long history that is continuing to evolve in the present day.

### **London parks history/process**

The history and governance of London's parks is a bit more complicated than in Chicago, particularly because the major open spaces used to be under the authority of the royal family. There are currently two separate types of park in London: those managed by Royal Parks—an executive managing agency that is part of the national Department of Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS)—as well as smaller neighborhood parks managed and funded by local borough councils. Neither of these agencies have the same history of conflict and autonomy as the Chicago Park District, but Royal Parks is responsible for overseeing 5,000 acres of parkland, including some of the most famous and historic parks in the world. These include Hyde Park and the Regent's Park as well as Green Park and St. James' Park near Buckingham Palace. The Royal Parks body has had this responsibility since 1851, when the royal family handed over control of these central city lands not vital to the Royal Household (Royal Parks). This body is tasked with presenting these parks to the public, while

the Metropolitan Police—now under the control of London’s city government—are in charge of policing these extensive public lands. The parks are not only used extensively by London’s residents, but they also generate millions of tourism visits and dollars every year, especially during major concerts and festivals throughout the summer. Royal Parks is officially designated as an “executive agency”, the only one in the DCMS, which operates within the organization but is officially a separate management agency. Funding for the 30 million pounds needed to maintain the parks each year comes not only from public sources, but also through private donations to the Royal Parks Foundation, a non-profit organization. About 25 million pounds of each year’s funding comes from DCMS, while the rest of the money is derived from concessions and user fees—7.2 million pounds last year—as well as small and large donations to the Foundation (Royal Parks). The management structure of Royal Parks is composed of the head of DCMS at the top, as well as a Chief Executive, management board, and advisory board. Royal Parks is focused not only on generating tourism dollars and providing a service to London’s residents, but also in achieving sustainability goals, releasing their first “Sustainability Report” last year.

In addition to these major parks, there is also a variety of small neighborhood parks that fall under control of borough councils, specifically their environmental or parks departments. Since this study focuses on parks as major urban development, understanding the way these are managed and funded is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, it is notable that parks in London are controlled by two distinct groups of people, both those interested in preserving historical resources and promoting tourism and those more interested in their local residents. Overall the

parks management and planning process is very different from that of Chicago, in that funding comes from the national government or very local sources. In addition, unlike Chicago parks management organizations have not historically had a contentious relationship with city government. It is not yet clear exactly how the Olympic Park will fit into this structure, but it will most likely be controlled by DCMS, whether or not Royal Parks has a significant amount of authority. Overall since it includes extensive athletic facilities as well as the open space, and is not a historic site like the other eight under Royal's control, it is more likely to be a somewhat autonomous unit. Chicago and London have different parks planning backgrounds, but both have valued open space throughout their histories.

### **Case Study 1: Millennium Park**

In recent years Mayor Daley has overseen the development of a wide variety of small neighborhood parks as well as the 500 million dollar Millennium Park and Northerly Island, a park built on the site of Meigs Field, an airport Daley had torn up in the middle of the night. Senka Park was built in the mostly Latino Gage park neighborhood in the mid-1990s, with land acquired by the Park District with the help of the Trust for Public Land, who purchased the 19 acres—that had been intended for development—from Grand Trunk and Western Railroad (Trust for Public Land). Millennium Park was Daley's major central-city redevelopment project, built on top of an underground parking garage, featuring a concert hall and several public art projects. The project, funded in large part by business interests, came in way over budget and has been plagued by accusations of corruption and patronage. Several other neighborhood parks, such as the new several-acre River North park and

residential development, also provide examples of where open space development prevailed against other projects.

In his 1909 Plan for Chicago Daniel Burnham created the vision for Chicago's major downtown lakefront open space, Grant Park. Construction began in 1917 and took several years, but left untouched a plot of land near the park owned by the Illinois Central Railroad. Citizens enjoyed Grant Park for the next half-century, but; "the railroad area remained a blight in its corner." In the 1970s the city needed a new bandshell, and the Chicago Park District proposed several different locations around the park. Civic groups threatened to block the proposal, so Chicago planning organizations asked them to propose an alternative. The Chicago civic groups proposed a park and performing arts center in 1977 for the unused railroad yard, but it, "lacked both a funding strategy and significant government support" (Green and Holli 1995). The powerful Park District overwhelmed weak mayoral support and built the shell in Grant Park, but in 1997 Mayor Richard M. Daley revived the idea of building a music venue on the existing railroad and parking spaces. In the early 1990s the "builder mayor" had proposed another major redevelopment project, "...a two-billion dollar land-based gambling casino near the lakeside of the downtown central business district". He failed to push the plan past a Republican governor and a state legislature unwilling to provide funds, hurting the chances for Daley to reward his business friends through casino contracts and jobs (Green and Holli 1995). Several years later Daley turned his attention back to a combination park and performing arts space, eventually hiring Frank Gehry to design the performing arts center (Ford 2004). This time Daley had no need for state funding, and his backing

coalition of downtown business interests, combined with immense political clout, overwhelmed weak opposition from groups that mostly took issue with the cronyism and funding. The Millennium Park was intended to open two years later in 2000 with a budget of 150 million dollars, but a variety of conflicts, delays, and cost overruns caused it to finally open on June 16, 2004 with a total cost of 475 million dollars (Chicago Tribune 2004; Ford 2004). Although the park is owned by the city, it is run as a public-private partnership and managed by a non-profit organization.

The final project oversight and funding sources differed significantly from original plans. Because the project involved railroad connections still vital to the city that would be interrupted, Daley tabbed the city's transportation department to manage it. After the scope of Millennium Park grew from a simple bandshell to include a wide variety of park areas, Daley transferred control to Chicago's powerful Public Buildings Commission (Neighborhood Capital Budget Group (NCBG)). Financing is a much more complicated story, as the city had to raise 325 million dollars more than it had planned at the project's outset. Daley made a promise to Chicago taxpayers before the park construction began that it would not cost them a dime, and in the end he arguably stuck to his word. The bulk of the initial funding—120 million dollars—was to come from an underground parking garage constructed in conjunction with the park. The city would buy revenue bonds and pay them back with parking funds. Private investors were to provide the remainder of the funding (NCBG). The final financial tally includes 270 million dollars of "city" funding and a staggering 205 million in private funding. Of the city's 270 million, about 100 million came from a special property tax district called the Central Loop Tax

Increment Financing District (TIF) (Ford 2004). These controversial tax districts serve as major redevelopment tools for Daley. Assuming a constant property tax rate and baseline property value at the beginning of the 25-year district, a TIF is comprised of all funds raised from property value increases during the time period it exists (NCBG). There have been a variety of explanations for the increases in costs associated with certain parts of the park, including the bandshell skyrocketing from about 10 million to 60 million dollars. The increases came in many places, from a larger maintenance endowment to engineering challenges and an ever-expanding project scope (NCBG).

When looking at the outcome of Millennium Park, many question whether it is “A great result marred by a failed process?” (Kamin 2005). In June 2005 Chicago Tribune architecture critic Blair Kamin evaluated the first year of Millennium Park, concluding that, “The park, like the 1893 fair, is an instant city. And such cities do not unfold neatly, as in an urban planning textbook” (Kamin 2005). The outcome includes a variety of economic development success indicators in the region, the first being that, “The park draws an additional 4 million tourists a year to the area.” In addition several major development projects are taking place in the direct vicinity, causing property values to skyrocket. These include, “a 57-story condominium tower to the west; Lakeshore East, a 28- acre (11.3 ha), \$2.5 billion mixed-use neighborhood, to the north; and the conversion of a landmark office building to the south into 244 condominium units” (Urban Land Institute). Overall the park is a new model of open space development: a coalition of public and private interests that by economic, environmental, and social indicators is considered an overwhelming

success by almost all involved in the process. An initial analysis of the data on the development of Millennium Park points strongly in the direction of growth machine theory to explain the political outcome. Electoral theory also provides strong support, since Daley crafted his image as a “builder mayor” and increased his coalition of support with each election. This support proved vital to his success in garnering public support for Millennium Park.

### **Case Study 2: London’s Olympic Park**

London’s Olympic Park adds an even more expensive case study to my analysis of the politics behind urban parks development. Although the city is spending billions of dollars overall in a variety of different areas around the city, the borough of Stratford stands to derive the greatest benefit from the Games. One of the more economically depressed of London’s 33 boroughs, it will be the site of the 500-acre Olympic Park area, home to the 80,000 seat Olympic Stadium, Multi-Sport Arenas, the Aquatics Centre, and Athlete’s Village. After 2012 these venues will be downsized and the whole area will be converted into a massive urban park, also leaving behind 9,000 new housing units and a new international rail terminal. Although the government hopes these housing and transportation features will provide a kick-start to private sector redevelopment in the area, the centerpiece of the project remains the open space. The city and its residents place a high value on these features, and over 50% of the land area in London is classified by City Hall as either water or green space. Hyde Park and Regents Park, the former in a thriving central-city borough and the latter not far north of it, provide venues for tourism, concerts, exercise, and just about any form of public entertainment and recreation imaginable

by the nine million residents of London. The city government hopes that creating, “the largest new park in London since Victorian times” will provide the same opportunities and benefits for the residents of the five-borough region of East London they identified as in need of development (London Development Agency (LDA)).

The Lower Lea Valley, the East London site of the Olympic Park, represents one of the last areas in London for possible redevelopment, and was the prime target in the 2004 London Plan as the area to absorb London’s population growth over the next several decades. This long-term strategic planning effort, the first in decades for the city, outlines a program of regeneration intent on making London prosperous and accessible to all. East London is the most important piece of this regeneration puzzle, and since the Olympics will, “double the amount of green space currently in the Lower Lea Valley”; open space will provide the key resource for tourism and economic development. Although the River Lea provides 23% of London’s drinking water, the, “area is characterised by a large area of derelict industrial land as well as poor housing.” In addition, “Much of the land is fragmented and divided by waterways, overhead pylons, roads, the London Underground Network and heavy rail lines” (LDA). In addition to its degraded industrial past, the area has some of the poorest housing, highest unemployment, and high percentages of minority population in London. In many ways it seems like the classic venue for redevelopment as it has occurred over the last several decades in cities around the world. Instead of the typical mixed-use housing, shopping, and cultural opportunities that have driven these, however, London has chosen open space to drive the local economy. This “brownfields” development has taken place in other parts of the city with some

success, including Gunpowder Park, a former industrial area purchased by a non-profit organization and converted into an environmental and arts community center. Major economic development has not followed.

The folks at the new City Hall, itself part of a successful redevelopment effort on the Thames' south bank, seem confident that the environment-friendly government can deliver. The Olympics represents the most significant project undertaken so far by the GLA—composed of the London Assembly and the Mayor's Office—which held elections for the first time in 2000. It replaced the Greater London Council, a similar body abolished in 1986. Perhaps this explains the failure and cost overruns of recent urban development projects—the Millennium Dome and Wembley Stadium in particular—that create negative images in a skeptical public's mind. The most important role of the body is to direct essential public services in London, especially transportation. Transport for London (TfL), a body that Mayor Ken Livingstone deems so vital that he heads it himself, coordinates all 13 Underground routes along with the 6 million bus rides taken in the city every day (Mayor of London). Many City Hall officials believe that public transportation is the most important way to improve the London environment. The municipal government has clashed with the UK government on several development projects related to transportation, including Crossrail, a multi-billion dollar East-Central London link Livingstone deems vital to regenerating the area. Livingstone's other major transportation pet project—named “Congestion Charging”—forces motorists to pay each time they enter the central city, is looking to increase rates, expand its scope, and charge higher rates for vehicles with greater emissions. It has served as a model for many other cities proposing

similar schemes. Livingstone's individuality, forthrightness, and above all commitment to the environment have won him many supporters and enemies at home as well as international notoriety. The elected London Assembly critiques and helps develop his decisions and budgets in the areas of long-term planning and economic development in particular. More local services are carried out in each of the 33 boroughs, allowing the mayor to focus on broader goals and allocations. Although a member of the Labour Party, Livingstone was first elected as an independent candidate, and the municipal government puts much less emphasis on party politics compared to the national government (Mayor of London).

The official bid process for the Olympic Games began in early 2003, as with the July 15<sup>th</sup> bid deadline on the horizon British Parliament for the first time debated the prospects of submitting a London bid for the Olympics. Although other events intervened to delay the debate, in May Cabinet Minister for Culture, Media, and Sport Tessa Jowell—who now serves as Minister of the Olympics as well—announced that the national government would officially support a London bid. The city quickly began planning under a variety of leaders, but the bid did not take off until it fell under the central leadership of Lord Sebastian Coe, an Olympic gold-medal winner in the 1500-meter run in both the 1980 and 1984 Games. London 2012 unveiled its first plans for the Games on January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2004, where Chairman Barbara Cassani stressed improving sports and health, industry, and the environment as the prime objectives of the hosting effort. From the beginning the bid had support of many local leaders in East London, with Mayors and Council leaders pointing to community benefits, economic development, and diversity understanding as major outcomes (London

2012). Prominent athletes and politicians—especially Ken Livingstone—stepped forward as well to express their support and willingness to help with the bid process. The original bid document prominently displayed the new Olympic Park, to be, “set amid a revitalised network of waterways within 1,500 acres stretching from Hackney Marshes down to the Thames, and forming one of the biggest urban parks ever laid out in Europe.” In addition, it linked this park to regeneration benefits, stating, “The Olympic Park will be established as part of the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley which will encompass the most extensive transformation seen in London for more than a century” (London 2012). The plan also set out initial financing strategies, with an anticipated 17 billion in total transportation spending already set before 2012, and 450 million more set aside if they won the bid. As far as general funding, the mayor’s office only committed 20 million pounds initially, with 1.5 billion of the 2.375 billion in national funding set to come from the Lottery, 625 million from taxes, and 250 million from the LDA. As far as private funding, it was mentioned briefly, with the expectation of generating only 5-12 million pounds (London 2012). After finding out in May of 2004 London had advanced to the final five—along with New York, Paris, Madrid, and Moscow—Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as other top Olympic officials, set out to spread the word around the globe. Their message focused on the diversity of London, the support and vitality of its youth, their athlete-centered focus, the environment-friendly development, and its existing and potential infrastructure as reasons for “Backing the Bid” (London 2012). Hundreds of thousands of residents registered their names with London 2012 to express support.

Since the Olympics are still so far off, it may seem silly to analyze the political process behind them right now. However, the major decisions have already taken place, and the development of East London will proceed with a major park as its centerpiece. Overall the Olympic procedure has been the product of a variety of different actors, with unique resources, processes, and outcomes associated. Because the park is so closely tied to the Games, it may be difficult to separate it from the larger scheme. Overall, however, when the sports are over, the bottom line remains that London has chosen to make a major park, with associated housing and transport links, as its most expensive and important urban development project of the new century. Analyzing the political process behind this outcome, with careful attention paid to my four comparison criteria for each theory, will allow it to be contrasted with Millennium Park, a similar but distinct urban park development in Chicago, IL.

### **Original hypothesis**

Overall, considering this background information my hypothesis is that the growth machine thesis, as outlined by Molotch, successfully explains the explosion of environmentally sustainable open space development over the past two decades of Chicago's political agenda. Although the product looks different, it has served the same goals as previous economic development projects. One possible alternative hypothesis would be the growing power and influence of neighborhood and environmental groups in the electoral and political process. I have studied not only elite actors, but incorporated Ferman's analysis of community based organizations to see if their role in Chicago has changed since the writing of her book. Many people believe that these groups have finally broken through to gain a primary spot at the

bargaining table. Another conventional argument—fitting with elite theory—holds that Mayor Daley simply has a passion for the environment, based on personal feelings, the historic motto of Chicago stretching back to Daniel Burnham, and a genuine desire to make the city a model of sustainability to the world. He has often used these arguments to justify major expenditures on environmental issues, trying to be seen as a Mayor who only wants to return his city to its past glory, and return its land from industry to citizens (Schneider 2006). All three of these possible arguments may help resolve a part of my central question, but I predict growth machine theory still provides a complete explanation for these new environmental initiatives. One of the main goals of this study is also to discover how political actors can successfully promote parks development in urban areas to benefit the economy, community, and environment.

## **Chapter Two: Literature Review and Overview of Evaluation Matrix**

Regime analysis, and particularly growth machine analysis, has been the central focus of the majority of urban political literature for many years (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). In addition, scholars often argue green initiatives are the product of the growing influence of neighborhood and special interest groups (Ferman 1996). In developing my analytical framework I sought to account for both of these tendencies, and capture the wide range of political forces at work in Chicago and London. One goal was to pay closer attention to the predictions of growth machine, regime, and elite theory, since Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park are major urban development projects that affect the economy of their cities. I also focused on the potential influence of progressive politics or neighborhood and community groups to see if these parks were the product of these traditional environmental forces.

Based on a review of urban political theory, I have chosen to test the application of five major theories against the four most important criteria in the case of urban political outcomes. These four criteria aim to capture the essential elements of the politics behind urban development and provide a framework specific to urban redevelopment projects as well as environmental and open space initiatives. Choosing four criteria for comparison will make it easier to see where the predictions of theories differ and where they overlap. These criteria—dominant actors/concentration of power, resources used, primary goals, and pathways of influence—are drawn from previous studies as well as literature describing the essential elements of the urban political process. Using five theories rather than just

one—many urban political researchers base their studies on regime theory—enhances my ability to explain the political outcomes in Chicago and London.

In order to determine which theory best describes the politics behind Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park I have outlined the criteria against which the process can be compared. I have also given a brief overview of each theory, including how their predictions differ in the four major areas of comparison: the concentration of power and dominant actors, primary goals and outcomes, resources used by these actors, and their pathways for influence. These criteria represent the full process of urban development, from the initial goal setting, to the formation of a body to implement the policy, to their specific actions, and finally to the outcomes.

There are distinct advantages to choosing these five particular theories. First they represent the major trends in urban political theory over the past several decades. Most are backed by a landmark study that defines the theory and finds it powerful for explaining an urban political outcome. Electoral theory stands out in this respect, but it fills an important gap in the explanatory power of the four other theories. In addition, these five theories are interrelated, predicting similar outcomes for some criteria and different ones for others.

**Table 4: Evaluation Matrix**

	<b>Dominant Actors/ Concentration of Power</b>	<b>Primary Goals</b>	<b>Resources Used</b>	<b>Pathways for Influence</b>
<b>Growth Machine Theory</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Real estate developers.</li> <li>-Top government officials.</li> <li>-City contractors and construction companies.</li> <li>-City newspapers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Create developments that maximize the economic value of urban land.</li> <li>-Concentrate power among those who favor this objective.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Private money from donors, investors, and development projects.</li> <li>-Political capital from powerful allies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Planning organizations and hearing boards.</li> <li>-Dominance of media coverage outlets.</li> <li>-“Power of the purse”: ability to purchase land.</li> </ul>
<b>Pluralist Theory</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Power fragmented among a variety of actors depending on policy area.</li> <li>-Non-governmental organizations, local elected officials, and bureaucracy.</li> <li>-Neighborhood and community development groups.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Create a de-centralized government with many groups wielding influence on their agenda.</li> <li>-Promote access to disadvantaged groups.</li> <li>-Distribute resources based on need.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Political will from a large group or community with shared interests.</li> <li>-Pooled monetary strength and influence from national organizations with local chapters.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Local media attention, press releases, and sometimes national publicity.</li> <li>-Lobbying government officials or protesting decisions through strikes.</li> <li>-Electoral strength because of their large numbers.</li> <li>-Government meetings, boards, or planning agencies.</li> </ul>
<b>Regime Theory</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Usually wealthy business, cultural, and top political actors form a concentrated ruling coalition with mutual goals.</li> <li>-Sometimes other NGOs or actors included.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Maintain the leadership of the urban regime.</li> <li>-Create favorable policies for business growth.</li> <li>-Exclude other groups from having influence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Top level political decision making power.</li> <li>-Extensive donor network and control of jobs in the city, economic resources.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Mayor’s office and other city government agencies.</li> <li>-Access to elite actors in local media.</li> <li>-Financing of major urban development projects or cultural institutions.</li> </ul>
<b>Elite Theory</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Power concentrated in the hands of one dominant actor who has the power to shape the course of an issue to serve his/her personal objectives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Further personal objectives in a particular issue area.</li> <li>-Maintain a position of power, and leave behind a favorable legacy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Personal reputation and background of power and success (charisma).</li> <li>-Generally can harness all resources necessary, monetary, political, and media, to promote goals.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Extensive exposure of goals in local and national media.</li> <li>-Access to and trust of top-level decision-makers and urban power brokers, or being one themselves.</li> <li>-Whatever means necessary to achieve goals; will make any alliances needed.</li> </ul>
<b>Electoral Theory</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Power decentralized, in the hands of millions of voters who can decide who has it.</li> <li>-Power concentrated among elected public officials.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-To maintain support of constituency by furthering their objectives, and also broaden appeal.</li> <li>-To gain re-election and stay in power.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Networks of political party members and donors.</li> <li>-Broader support from national political party.</li> <li>-Money from wealthy donors, businesses, unions, or other groups.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Passing laws and regulations that govern the city.</li> <li>-Appointing public officials and members of bureaucracy.</li> <li>-Public media exposure.</li> <li>-Handing out contracts for city projects.</li> </ul>

## **Pluralism**

Many theorists agree that pluralism is central to any study of urban political theory, not because it, "...is more 'correct' or 'convincing' than any of the other theories", but it is, "...the theory from which many perspectives on urban politics have developed, or against which many others have set themselves" (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995). Although pluralism remains difficult to define, Robert Dahl's study of New Haven, CT politics in *Who Governs?* provides the basis for its principles. Pluralist theory argues that fragmentation and decentralization of power among disparate groups—including non-governmental ones—defines the policymaking process. In a pluralist system these groups have the access and resources needed to achieve power, and political outcomes reflect this division. It also claims that this is a desirable feature of any democratic process since it promotes citizen involvement (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995).

Pluralist theory has evolved in a variety of different directions, but these core tenets form the backbone of the theory. There is no central concentration of power among dominant actors, as the decision making authority is variable between different political issues. In my study this would predict powerful influence from non-governmental environmental and commercial organizations as well as neighborhood and community groups in the planning process. The primary goals of a pluralist system are to provide access to power for all citizens in a decentralized government, and in my study this might suggest development resources and political influence are spread throughout the city. Resources in a pluralist government are monetary and political power of local interest groups. Finally, the pathways of

influence would be through issue and group specific press releases and news conferences, as well as lobbying of local officials, protests, and attendance at local planning hearings. Overall, pluralist theory is defined by fragmentation of decision making power between different issue areas.

### **Elite theory**

Perhaps the theory most diametrically opposed to pluralism, elite theory argues that a powerful few control the political and economic apparatus in a city, and thus determine the course of decision-making and policy across issue areas. It argues that, "...control over crucial resources like property, money, the legitimate use of violence, political influence, scientific knowledge and so on is concentrated in the hands of the few." There are two opposed groups: a small elite at the top of the ladder who hold the reigns to power, and the mass of people they rule over down below with little or no impact on society (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995). Elite theory in general does not pass judgment on whether this organization is good for society, a topic on which scholars have widely divergent viewpoints.

Hunter's 1953 study of Atlanta politics provided a scientific and theoretical basis for future study. One unique method he used was reputational analysis, in which he asked judges to rank the power of a group of individuals belonging to major civic organization and then interviewed them to determine perceived power levels (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995). Although his work has come under criticism for a variety of reasons, this type of analysis is useful in determining the dominant actors and concentration of power in a major urban redevelopment project. Elite theory predicts that urban elites determine the course of development, have a high degree of

overlap between organizations, are small in number, and have close relationships with each other on different projects. The goals of elite actors vary based on personal objectives, but a common one is the use of major development projects to promote their legacy. Elites rely on personal reputation, status, and respect as a community leader, as their primary resources, as well as political and monetary support from government and business. Finally, one major pathway for influence is exposure in local and national media so elite actors can easily promote their objectives and shut out other opinions. The pathways are unlimited, with a small group having access to the top levels of power across the spectrum of issues. The most important difference from pluralist theory comes in this concentration of power in the hands of a few, as well as the exclusion of local groups to preserve their own dominance. However, sometimes elite actors control outside groups and allow their access when beneficial to their personal goals. Elite theory is defined by a small governing group that pursues personal objectives and is intent on maintaining their power.

### **Regime theory**

To some scholars regime theory represents a neo-pluralist viewpoint of disparate groups influencing policy, but the key difference is that regime actors have an impact that extends beyond one single issue area. Clarence Stone wrote what is known as the, “most advanced application of regime analysis”, studying Atlanta politics during the 1980s (Stone 1989). His work focuses on how diverse groups of actors, some governmental and some from other institutions, “combine forces and resources for a ‘publicly significant result’ – a policy initiative or development.” Regimes are further characterized by their informality, in contrast to the typical

forced hierarchy of government, as well as cooperation and network building based on shared interests. In contrast to pluralism, a regime does not simply break up when the issue is over, participants see value in its continued success (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995). In contrast to elite theory, regime theorists argue that governments or individuals are unable to hold complete power, and must join with those who own the vital resources.

Stone gives some treatment to the power of citizens and elections to affect the process, but overall he argues that policy outcomes are driven by the, “ ‘composition of a community’s governing coalition, the nature of the relationships among members of the governing coalition, and the resources that members bring to the governing coalition’ ” (Stone 1989). Regime theory predicts urban development projects are driven by a dominant group of actors, traditionally seen as business interests, joining with top political decision makers in shared self-interest. Some regimes also have neighborhood and interest groups. The regime seeks to maintain its dominance and promote business interests or self-interests of other regime members. Major resources are access to top-level political decision-makers and economic leaders who have influence in a variety of interest areas. Finally, regime actors’ pathways of influence are through the top level of city government, control of community economic institutions, and access to citywide media outlets. The central claim of regime theory is that cities are governed by a group of actors from a variety of sectors to access each other’s resources and promote individual and common goals.

## **Growth machine theory**

Growth machine theory is closely related to regime and elite theory, but it has some important differences. Growth machine coalitions are also small groups of usually elite actors, but their main goal is to direct urban political and economic power towards increasing population, wealth, and infrastructure. It can also be thought of as one issue area of pluralism theory. Growth machine theory argues that, “...the desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized local elite, however split they might be on other issues” (Molotch 1976, 309). It also emphasizes the power of entrepreneurs and individuals to shape political outcomes. The essential goal of the central group, *rentiers* or landowners, is to maximize the overall exchange value of land, but they need to ally with those who benefit from development to achieve this goal. This brings developers, planners, and architects, among others, into the machine. Other groups, such as media and utilities, as well as sports and cultural groups, are also often included because they derive indirect benefits from growth. Local governments support these coalitions because they lack the economic resources to carry out major development projects. In addition, anti-growth regimes or coalitions have gained power in some cities, which can be fitted into one of the other theories (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995).

The primary concern of growth machine theorists is analyzing the urban development process, making it particularly useful to case studies of Millennium Park and London’s Olympic Park. Unlike previous theories, growth machine actors are typically drawn from specific business sectors—developers, planners, architects, and

the media—who dominate the development process with support from top-level government officials. Their main goals are maximizing the exchange value of land, and preserving power in the hands of those who have this goal. This can be seen either in stated goals or outcomes. Resources are primarily monetary but also take the form of top-level political support. Pathways of influence include alliances with planning administrators or city planning officials, dominance of media outlets in promoting their growth projects, and financial strength. Growth machine theory argues that coalitions of specific actors dominate politics and development in urban areas; making growth the central focus of a city.

### **Electoral theory**

The final theory I will apply to these open space development projects is electoral theory. It places control in the hands of the political institutions typically thought of as having the power in an urban, or national, society. Since these public officials have the power to pass legislation, make executive orders, appoint bureaucrats, dish out patronage jobs, and control what gets built and where through planning commissions, they have the ultimate power. Since elected officials and bureaucrats enjoy their power and jobs for a variety of reasons, and want to continue to do them, they must win the vote of the electorate. They achieve this through a variety of policies, from improved public infrastructure to extra school money for a local ward alderman. Electoral theory argues that this motivation is central to political and economic outcomes in the urban environment (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995).

Electoral theory differs from each of the previous theories by placing power in the hands of people with diverse interests at a local scale, but combined general interests at citywide scales that are reflected in the decisions of their elected officials. These decisions extend across all issue areas, although officials must cater to what they believe is the majority. Dominant actors are the elected and appointed officials, but the concentration of power is ultimately in the hands of the majority of the electorate. These officials generally have one goal: getting re-elected, and they can achieve this through either solidifying and turning out their base of support—sometimes tied to a political party—or widening their appeal. Resources take the form of political networks and relationships, extending up to national parties, but also campaign contributions and endorsements from local business or neighborhood leaders. The pathways of influence are traditional ones: passing laws, appointing public officials, handing out patronage jobs, and taking advantage of media exposure. This could mean promoting development in a place where the official needs support, or will not create much controversy. Electoral theory claims that elected officials are the primary power brokers in a city, and their central goal is to maintain this position of authority.

### **Procedure for analyzing case studies**

Using this framework I have compared the predictions of these five theories to the political process behind Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park. First I have provided an overview of the process for each project, including how it first began, the evolution through different goals and leaders, how they wielded their power, and the current outcome. The aim of this description is to provide

comprehensive background on the case study in areas that can be explained by each political theory. Next, I go over each criterion, describing in detail the politics and actors of that particular segment. After that, I compare the five political theories to each criterion and the overall process. Finally, I compare the case studies of Chicago and London, paying attention to where the explanations are similar and where they differ across my four criteria. From this comparison I have created a comprehensive theory that accounts for both case studies. I then compare these conclusions to recent trends in urban development and politics literature. I conclude by suggesting directions for future research that can build off this study. The evaluation matrix forms the basis for all of this analysis. Using a framework based on five political theories will allow me to use the total body of knowledge of urban politics literature and produce unique conclusions that do not dilute any existing theory. In addition, comparing them across four criteria will provide a strong basis for comparing and contrasting the different theories and my two case studies.

## **Chapter Three: Chicago's Millennium Park**

### **The Story from Start to Finish**

According to many accounts, the Millennium Park story begins sometime in the mid-1990s during a routine dentist visit for Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, with him looking out the window towards Grant Park and wishing that the city could make better use of the old Illinois Central rail terminal site, a long-time blight on the lakefront park and museum complex. The idea to use this land for a cultural space, however, dates back many decades, long before Park District attorney Randy Mehrberg realized that the 1848 Illinois Central easement to use the land for “railroad purposes” no longer applied because they had turned the space into free parking for company employees and friends. Once he set this process of acquisition—shocking to many who had always assumed the city had little claim to this prime real estate—into motion, suddenly a wide range of proposals came forth reflecting the variety of problems currently weighing on Chicago’s downtown loop area. Although the project eventually morphed from a 30 million dollar green space to a 400+ million dollar international cultural destination, it began as neither of these; instead it started out as a proposed transportation link of the city’s main convention centers with its prime art attractions and shopping on Michigan Avenue. In addition, this transportation center would also include a parking garage that would provide a steady revenue stream for the city, and ease the parking pressure on the new Soldier Field as well as the growing central city residential population (Gilfoyle 2006).

Daley took this original conception to his advisor Ed Bedore and long-time Chicago Park District employee Ed Uhlir—the two main city employees involved

throughout the project—before asking world-renowned Chicago architecture firm Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill’s (SOM) Adrian Smith to design a preliminary plan for the garage and park. Smith based his original design in part on the 1909 Burnham Plan as well as Robert Hutchins’ Lakefront Gardens proposal from the 1970s, a plan whose ultimate failure is a major piece of the Millennium Park puzzle. The 10,000-seat bandshell, great lawn, and overall layout provided the backbone, and even though, “specific elements in the SOM master plan were later altered or discarded, the fundamental scheme remained intact” (Gilfoyle 2006).

Since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century the proposals that were the precursors to Millennium Park were floated by various city agencies as well as outside civic organizations. Because of the increasing attendance at concerts in Grant Park, the city wanted to build a permanent music venue with in the neighborhood of ten to twenty thousand seats. One of the major problems faced by the proposal, however, was precedent dating back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century from a lawsuit originally brought by A. Montgomery Ward, such that any new construction above a certain height required approval of residents and landowners in the areas adjacent to the park. Because of its design, a 1962 bandshell proposal backed by the Park District met with insurmountable opposition from, “a coalition of ten civic groups led by the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council (MHPC) and the City Club”, as well as, “Several Michigan Avenue property owners” (Gilfoyle 2006). Traffic concerns made underground garages a key part of several early proposals, but the city and local groups could not agree on a proposal. A city-endorsed project in 1972 was 85 feet tall, included massive retaining walls, and once again met with MHPC opposition,

although local residents and newspapers supported the project. The “political patronage army” of the Chicago Park District declined alternative proposals, and several activists founded Friends of the Parks, a non-profit seeking citizen access to an organization thought, “unresponsive to a wide array of public needs and complaints” (Gilfoyle 2006). Five years later the Park District proposed another bandshell design, and once again civic groups, including Friends of the Parks (FOTP) and the MHPC opposed, having their own Lakefront Gardens plan designed by SOM architect Robert Hutchins. A potential sale of the Illinois Central land in the late 1970s almost brought the proposal to fruition, but once again the civic groups clashed with CPD head Ed Kelly, “who ran the public agency like a personal patronage machine” (Gilfoyle 2006). Mayor Michael Bilandic supported the project however, and a temporary bandshell was built, and the park proposal was on the table with a price tag of 25-30 million dollars. Over the next fifteen years, however, political changes, a lack of funding, and inadequate support led to the eventual permanent shelving of the proposal in 1992 (Gilfoyle 2006).

Just six years later, however, Richard M. Daley started formulating the Lakefront Millennium Project and appointing prominent Chicago businessman John Bryan head of fundraising for the 30 million dollar park that topped a 120 million dollar parking garage. Once the city repaid its bonds, the public would have a park and garage at zero cost to taxpayers, and Daley would have the lasting impact he desire on the city’s lakefront. Bryan quickly took charge, having shown his support for a millennium project in a recent speech, and decided the original goal was too modest, desiring, “to make it at the highest level”, with each element, “to be using the

best that we have today”, in terms of art and design (Gilfoyle 2006). Daley allowed Bryan almost total control of the surface from this point on, as the original simple green space added Frank Gehry to design the bandshell and bridge, as well as internationally known sculptors Anish Kapoor and Jaume Plensa for multi-million dollar works of art. In addition, a Music and Dance Theater was added, as major Chicago foundations and companies signed on to leave their own mark on a slice of the city’s millennium legacy. Bryan raised his funds in large chunks using a carefully crafted approach of finding a donor of 5-15 million dollars from a short list of Chicago’s elite for each major element, and creating a list of “Millennium Park founders” who each gave a gift of 1 million dollars or more. From May of 1998, when the Chicago City Council approved a plan to float 150 million dollars in bonds to be repaid by garage revenues for the park’s construction to its opening in May 2004, Millennium Park generated endless amounts of controversy, political maneuvering, and debate. Much of this was caused by an additional 33 million in bonds in 1999 and Daley’s use of Tax Increment Financing District Funds through 2002. In the end Bryan raised a total of 173.5 million dollars in private funds for the park (Gilfoyle 2006). Since the park’s opening, it has been a complete success by most accounts, as well as seeing the construction of major new office and especially residential buildings nearby in the central loop area. It has left a major impact on the city of Chicago, and the events that led to its creation and impact provide a fascinating political case study that sheds light on the nature of urban economy, environment, and government at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Criterion 1: Dominant Actors/Concentration of Power**

When considering the overall process that led to the creation of Millennium Park as it exists today, two dominant figures stand out above all the rest: Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley and former Sara Lee CEO John Bryan. Although the park is widely seen as one of Daley's crowning achievements as a "green mayor" of Chicago, Bryan was also a significant driving force. Expanding the lens further to include more peripheral actors, they would have to fall into two categories: those controlled by Daley and those controlled by Bryan. Very few individuals or groups who did not fall under either of their spheres of influence had any finite control over the major decisions shaping the future of Millennium Park. These two figures essentially had complete control over the park, frequently taking ideas back and forth for discussion before delivering a final verdict to their respective departments. Daley had control over the previously powerful Park District and City Council, while Bryan had control over local interest and environmental groups as well as every major cultural non-profit organization in the city.

Bryan is one of the most well respected businessmen in Chicago, having served on the board of trustees for the Chicago Symphony and chairman of the board of trustees for the Art Institute, Millennium Park's powerful neighbor, among many other groups. Through these experiences he became connected with Chicago's elite and known as a passionate philanthropist to whom they could feel comfortable giving money, as they knew he would only ask if it was for a worthy cause. Nearly 15 years earlier, "he had been an instrumental force in raising money to renovate Chicago's Lyric Opera House and Orchestra Hall, raising 100 million in three years. This was

at the time, “believed to be the largest amount of money ever given by a business community in support of a local cultural project” (Gilfoyle 2006). He was just as successful in his corporate career at making money as he was at raising it later on, leading Sara Lee for nearly two decades and completely transforming the financial status of the company. Bryan was also socially conscious during his tenure, generating even more respect for his leadership. He, “transformed Sara Lee into a corporate model for breaking down gender and racial barriers” (Gilfoyle 2006).

Daley, on the other hand, had built political capital and respect over several decades, with his electoral margins growing with each cycle and his reputation as a “builder mayor” focused on major urban development projects, but also committed to a serious green roof initiative. His leadership has also caused, and benefited from two major changes in the nature of Chicago politics over the past two decades. According to most scholars, over the past several decades since Daley was first elected, the nature of Chicago government had dramatically shifted away from the Democratic patronage political machine of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century towards a more open, modern political system. The Chicago Park District in particular, once a source of machine money and jobs, and an independent taxing agency of city residents, has become a much more open, streamlined organization that does not have as strong a voice in city land-use decisions. In addition, when Daley created Millennium Park he removed control from the hands of the CPD, instead placing it in a private organization whose membership he could control much more easily. In this way he increased his dominance of the project, further removing potential opposition.

Over the last 20 years the City Council has also changed dramatically, also passing from the Democratic political patronage stage through a period of conflict to the current state. According to Professor Dick Simpson (2004) of the University of Illinois at Chicago, a scholar of Chicago politics for many decades, “Richard M. Daley’s control over the government is nearly absolute.” These changes are reflected in the percentage of roll-call votes going in the Mayor’s favor, which had increased nearly every year until the past few, when several younger Council members are becoming more independent and willing to oppose the Mayor. However, he argues that, “The Chicago City Council remains an unreformed, Rubber Stamp Council that simply endorses proposals put forth by the mayor’s administration, rather than providing a legislative democracy.” Because of this, Daley has also, “...forced through major urban renewal programs despite public opposition”, and, “...pushed businesses to rebuild the Loop” (Simpson et al. 2004). In addition, despite the rising opposition from some council members, a long time Daley ally, Burton F. Natarus, has served the 42<sup>nd</sup> ward, including Millennium Park, for the entire length of the Mayor’s tenure. His electoral coalition has also expanded to include the majority of Chicago’s African-American and Hispanic residents. In addition, Mayor Daley has also been able to push through several major projects such as the closure of Meigs Field and creation of the Northerly Island park, on his own and in the middle of the night. All in all, Chicago residents know that when the mayor wants something done, he will make it happen.

Clearly these two had demonstrated the connections and leadership skills necessary to carry out this project, and combined proceeded to push Millennium Park

forward. Daley would handle the political aspects, ensuring the vital cooperation of local residents and city organizations that Lakefront Gardens had lacked some 20 years earlier. He assigned a loyal personal advisor, Ed Bedore, to the project, and chose a Park District employee, the sticking point in the late 70s, Ed Uhler, as project manager. Daley also endured and deflected the brunt of the media criticism for cost overruns and corruption, allowing John Bryan to undergo his fundraising and design tasks unscathed. He also stuck to his original word on having no tax money go to the project—although this is debatable because of the use of TIF funds—having the political sense to know that residents would vigorously oppose opening their pockets for what appeared to be his pet project. Because of his take-no-prisoners history and network of local ward support, Daley silenced the opposition. Bryan proceeded to develop his “two-pronged” fundraising strategy, persuading Chicago’s elite corporations, foundations, and individuals that they owed a debt to the city for all that it had given them, and Millennium Park would be the perfect way to demonstrate that gratitude. All grateful citizens who enjoyed the park would forever remember them as Chicago’s leaders at the turn of the century. His pitch worked, and the Fields, Pritzkers, Wrigleys, and other families as well as BP and Ameritech all gave what he asked, and acknowledged that without Bryan it never would have been possible. He also filled Millennium Park’s committees with knowledgeable arts and financial people whom he knew and trusted from previous engagements, and allowed each family substantial freedom in selecting their own designers. When the Pritzkers wanted Frank Gehry Bryan convinced the mayor they could afford him and he would be a huge success, despite Daley’s original opposition—by some accounts—to

Gehry's bridge design (Gilfoyle 2006). All in all, John Bryan's network of relationships with Chicago's elite, his masterful fundraising, and personal leadership skills, gave him the power and dominance necessary to make Millennium Park happen. Mayor Daley delivered the stable political environment vital to his success.

### **Other actors and interest groups**

Although there were certainly other actors and groups involved in the Millennium Park project besides Mayor Daley and John Bryan, the concentration of power radiated outwards from these two dominant actors. Bryan's network of donors had a significant amount of control over their park sections, as did their associated cultural groups. One specific part of the process where this was borne out was the creation of the mid-sized Music and Dance Theater, something far from the original intent of the project. In this case because donors had the vital funding available, they were able to seize a lot of power in directing the project. However, in the end Daley and Bryan had to agree with and approve of the decisions made by the relevant committees that had charge of their sections. In addition, although secondary actors in city government, such as the Public Buildings Commission, had control over parts of the project, they ultimately fell under Daley's authority. He also removed the Chicago Park District from the project, a major actor that influenced previous plans for converting this land to a park. Designers such as Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill and Frank Gehry asserted their influence over Millennium Park by producing the major design elements that came to define it, but ultimately these required the approval of Daley and Bryan. Lakefront landowners also had some influence over

the project, in limiting the height of the structures, but this was not a major deterrent for the project, since it was not intended to have major structures anyway.

**Table 5: Comparison with Lakefront Gardens**

	<b>Mayoral Situation</b>	<b>Powerful Actors</b>	<b>Opposition</b>
<b>Millennium Park</b>	-Stable, control over City Council	-Richard Daley -John Bryan -Network of their personal friends and advisors	-Mostly newspapers, criticism of TIF funding
<b>Lakefront Gardens</b>	-Unstable, lack of support in City Council	-Chicago Park District -Various leaders of cultural/ arts organizations	-Chicago Park District leaders, local landowners

**Criterion 2: Primary Goals**

Although the variety of different actors in support of Millennium Park no doubt all had different objectives for the project, there are a few that stand out above all others. It will also be important to compare the stated goals of the project to actual outcomes in order to determine whether or not those objectives were achieved, or whether there were unintended outcomes. In addition, there may be goals that are stated by the major actors in the process but are actually not what they want. This is a complicated process and looking at the outcomes—products of their actions—will help pinpoint their true goals. I will break down the goals based on the major actors, as well as others.

**Dominant Actor #1: Richard M. Daley**

Daley’s main goals can be broken down by stages: originally his main goal was simply to remove the unsightly railroad yards from the Illinois Central land and create a park on top of a parking garage. These objectives have been stated many times in interviews and newspaper articles. Daley has always seen parks and green

space as a valuable use of land. His reason for wanting to increase the amount of open space in the central city is he believes locating this land in the Loop would make it usable for all city residents, not just a few groups. The park started out as a glorified “green roof” above the parking garage, something that has been a part of Daley’s strategy for years. The reasons behind this desire for open space, as he states, are to preserve the historical tradition of Chicago as “The City in a Garden”, but also a potential unstated goal of increasing his electoral coalition. The second part is the product of several long-held goals by many city employees, not just Daley himself. It has been clear for many years, and stated by Ed Bedore and Ed Uhlir, that the city needed a transportation link as well as remote parking for Soldier Field in this location. The reasons behind this are to promote the conference industry, and thereby central loop economic development, as well as to make travel between the museum campus and Michigan Avenue more accessible. This transportation goal also had support from a variety of city agencies and regional planning commissions (Gilfoyle 2006). All in all, this is a clear economic objective for central loop development, one of Daley’s long held goals. One specific benefit is that in this case the goals are mutually beneficial, he can promote his environmental and economic development initiatives simultaneously. This economic development goal is borne out in impact studies as well as the construction of many new residential buildings in the central Loop in recent years. These types of economic development, while not specific objectives, still represent one of Daley’s larger goals for the project and his administration. A study prepared for the city’s Department of Planning and Development found that 1.4 billion dollars of residential development has been or

will be produced by Millennium Park. In addition, visitor spending is projected to generate 2 billion dollars for the city, in addition to about 750 full time jobs, as well as about 200 million dollars in tax revenue (Goodman Williams Group, URS Corporation 2005). Finally, Daley was also able to achieve his goal of awarding contracts to supporters of his administration. He has long been known as a “Builder Mayor” and acknowledged this goal, as well as being supported by the construction and development industries in his election campaigns. Thus, although this is an unstated goal, he was able to take care of his political allies and supporters through this project. Daley received a lot of criticism in the newspapers for this outcome.

### **Dominant Actor #2: John Bryan**

John Bryan had two major interconnected goals in this project, and overall his goals also reflected those of the people he raised funds from. There was also one major unstated benefit to his specific value adding that many of the givers spoke about, and Bryan acknowledged on a few occasions. His first goal was to fulfill the task assigned to him by Mayor Daley, which was to raise the money necessary to complete Millennium Park and build a large enough endowment so a private organization could effectively run it for many years after its creation. Because of this he developed a fundraising strategy that centered on his own personal reasons for supporting the project but also those he believed would connect with potential major donors to Millennium Park. His sense of philanthropy and indebtedness to Chicago made Bryan believe that this millennium project should be a gift from Chicago’s wealthy to the city (Gilfoyle 2006). Thus the elite would be preserved, and also show how much they appreciated what Chicago has done for them. This sense of civic

pride hit home with many donors, almost all of whom have ties to the city stretching back many generations, and consider Chicago a unique place who residents deserve and would appreciate Millennium Park. Millennium Park has been criticized often for being an elitist project, but from their interviews it seems all of the donors vehemently reject this criticism, arguing that they wanted to make a space for all citizens to enjoy. Although at time the park has been closed for elite cultural events, overall attendance numbers show that the whole city has taken Millennium Park as a source of civic pride, as Bryan intended. Bryan's second personal goal, as shared by many donors, was to bring the best possible art and artists to work on the project, and, "shoot for the moon" (Gilfoyle 2006). The Pritzker family was the main driving force behind hiring Frank Gehry, and most of the families that supported a specific section of the park took financial and administrative responsibility for hiring an internationally known artist or designer. These competitions reflected both the past art background of Bryan and many other donors—who were used to identifying and associating with the best of the best—and also their goal of making this a suitable glorification of Chicago and themselves at the Millennium. Daley never shared these particular goals, but he for the most part supported and trusted Bryan, not wanting to micro-manage the fundraising process. Finally, a related goal that Daley claims did not drive the project, was to achieve tourism and economic development through the "Bilbao Effect", named after the tiny Spanish city that turned into an international destination after Gehry designed a museum there. Bilbao used public funding almost exclusively, however. Although the donors and Bryan acknowledged this was not their primary goal, they did say that hiring international designers and building a

multi-cultural Music and Dance Theatre could certainly achieve this objective. Some were more open than others about this prospect, but many did believe that Millennium Park could boost Chicago's status as an international tourist destination (Gilfoyle 2006). The outcome remains that it has achieved this goal, as national and international media have covered and praised the art and sculpture in this "park" as a prime destination. The economic benefits of this increased tourism are also very real, and have been quantified. No doubt some of the founders working in the hospitality industry saw this as a more direct benefit when making donations. In this end this coincides nicely with Daley's goal of central loop development.

### **Goals of other actors**

Since I have previously argued that Richard M. Daley and John Bryan were the two dominant actors in the Millennium Park process, and everyone else fell under their control, nearly every goal actually reflects their desire as well. In addition to their goals, however, several small actors had fairly obvious goals. Newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune took advantage of the story to criticize Mayor Daley, as did many of his opponents, and point out his corruption and desire to further his personal objectives. Opposition groups truly had little say overall in the project, although some associations had a successful say in changing the height and selection of several sculptures as well as Gehry's bandshell. Also, a disability group succeeded in making the area completely handicap accessible. Aside from these goals and achievements, however, environmental, community, and cultural groups such as Friends of the Parks and arts organizations had interests in line with those of Bryan

and Daley, and thus shared the same goals. I address the potential reasons for this in my analysis.

**Table 6: Millennium Park Primary Goals**

<b>Richard Daley</b>	-Central loop economic development -Promote personal reputation -Inter-modal transportation link for central loop
<b>John Bryan</b>	-Fundraise enough money for the project -Make MP a showcase of the world's best arts/ culture -Preserve Chicago's elite at the time of the Millennium
<b>Donors</b>	-Provide a gift to all city residents from the wealthy -Elevate Chicago's status as a major arts/ cultural center -Preserve their name with a specific artist or sculptor
<b>Other actors/goals</b>	-The "Bilbao effect"- attracting major tourism and economic development -Reducing the visual impact of the park -Making the park accessible to disabled visitors -Selling newspapers

**Criterion 3: Resources Used**

This section will examine the political, social, and economic resources used by the two major actors in the Millennium Park process: Richard M. Daley and John Bryan. Bryan's resources were primarily social and economic, whereas Daley's resources were primarily political and economic. Other groups used their access to the media to voice their opposition, since the Chicago Tribune was opposed to the project for a while and published a wide range of articles criticizing cost overruns and corruption associated with Millennium Park.

**John Bryan: Economic and Social Resources**

The first major resource for John Bryan came in the form of the 200 million dollars he raised in order to fund all of the cultural improvements that have come to define Millennium Park. The full list of donors, amounts, and their industries is found in Timothy Gilfoyle's (2006) book *Millennium Park*, and reveals that the park was broadly supported by a variety of industries. He breaks down the Millennium Park "founders" by industry in which they made their money, dividing them into

finance, insurance, and real estate (FIR); service (communications, entertainment, accounting, law, and education); retail; and industry. Overall there are an astonishing 128 names listed, with a few appearing in multiple categories, all of whom donated over one million dollars to the park. Broken down in this manner, 53 or 46% of the donors came from the first category, 18 or 16% from service, 11 or 10% from retail, and 46 or 40% from industry (Gilfoyle 2006). The list reads like a typical Who's Who of Chicago over the last century, and includes a donation from Oprah Winfrey. Looking beyond the names, however, reveals that the vast majority of gifts came from individuals, corporations, or foundations in either FIR or industry. All of the major Chicago banks, including Bank One, Harris Bank, LaSalle Bank, and Northern Trust, contributed, as well as financial services firms Goldman Sachs and UBS. In the service area, Andersen, Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, SBC, and McDonalds all gave money, all national corporations with strong ties to the Chicago area. Under industry, Abbott (pharmaceutical), Boeing (aerospace/defense), BP Amoco (oil), and Sara Lee (consumer products) all gave money, demonstrating a wide range of support across business sectors (Gilfoyle 2006). The financial coalition behind Millennium Park was diverse, but tilted strongly in the direction of FIR and industry. This can be seen as divided between the people who stand to benefit directly from its creation, according to several studies, and those who have strong ties to Chicago, as industry formed the backbone of the city from its origins up to nearly the present day. The list reveals strong civic ties to the past as well as the future of the city. In addition, according to Gilfoyle (2006), nearly half of the city's Fortune 500 companies gave money, as well as 12 out of the 16 Global 500 companies. Even the

vast majority large, multinational corporations with seemingly little reason to donate money to Millennium Park contributed at least a few million dollars (Gilfoyle 2006). Although some of these gifts can be attributed to direct self interest, John Bryan and Chicago's civic and social culture seem to be responsible as well. According to the Economist, "Indeed, if you are the boss of a big business anywhere in the Chicago area, you are expected to take an active part in the civic life of the city." They also point out that, "the same names appear over and over again on the boards of universities, hospitals, museums, orchestras, opera companies and local charities." Finally, their study reveals that, "business is almost always an active participant in any public endeavour, from school reform to the creation of Millennium Park, the brand new \$475m park-cum-auditorium-cum-ice-rink-cum-fountain-cum-you-name-it just north of the Art Institute" (Economist 2006, 12). Bryan's fundraising strategy takes advantage of his membership in this society and culture of giving, as well as overlapping membership with the business and arts community. Indeed, of the donor foundations that gave to Millennium Park, four had given over 20 million dollars to Chicago organizations in one year, two more over 10 million, and nine more between 3 or 6.5 million dollars (Gilfoyle 2006). All in all, the strong social ties between John Bryan and the other donors, but more importantly the overlap between business and culture, and well as the culture of giving, all contributed to the success of Millennium Park.

### **Richard M. Daley: Political and Economic Resources**

The mayor's resources can be divided up into two categories: political and economic. His economic resources include mostly those directly associated with the

funding of Millennium Park. The first is funding from the city-owned parking garage that will be used to pay off the bonds floated to pay for its construction and for some of the park. Some have argued that without this resource Millennium Park would never have been possible. Because of the nature of urban government and taxes in Chicago, he has no way to finance a project like this without finding a creative funding solution such as this one. This represents a creative policy innovation that has taken place in several other cities, but nonetheless reveals the powerful control Daley exerts over land use, construction, and transportation projects in Chicago. In addition, Daley controversially dipped into funding from the Central Loop Tax Increment Financing (TIF) district in order to offset cost overruns. TIF funding works by diverting any excess property taxes from rising property values into a special fund intended for use in, “development projects and other public improvements” (Martin and Washburn 2001, 1). Daley allocated about 95 million dollars total from this fund for Millennium Park, dipping into it multiple times during the construction process. He was widely criticized for this move by the Tribune as well as watchdog group the Neighborhood Capital Budget Group for this move, as he had always claimed that the park would come at no cost to taxpayers (NCBG). There is still debate over whether this was an appropriate use of the funds, but TIFs have become increasingly important to funding development projects over the years. Daley’s use of them represents yet another fiscal tool at his disposal for Millennium Park. Daley has also taken advantage of his political resources, namely a mostly unchallenged mandate from his network of supporters to govern Chicago however he sees fit. Professor Dick Simpson and his colleagues (2004) have termed this the

“New Daley Machine”. On the campaign side, he argues, patronage has been replaced by, “candidate-based, synthetic campaigns using large sums of money from the global economy to purchase professional political consultants, public opinion polls, paid television ads, and direct mail.” In addition, “On the governing side, the new machine is characterized by a rubber stamp city council and public policies that benefit the new global economy more than the older developer economy.” Looking at election results, campaign contributions, City Council votes, and rewards to minorities, clearly Daley’s political resources have changed dramatically from his father and Harold Washington. From January 6<sup>th</sup>, 2000 until June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the City Council had only 13 divided roll call votes, compared to 111 and 32 respectively for Washington in 1985 and 1987 (Simpson et al. 2004). In addition, Daley has won a higher percentage of the vote every election cycle, leaving him with little opposition in 2003, winning 79% of the vote (Chicago Tribune 2003, 4). As far as financial support, in the 1999 campaign 17% of Daley’s money came from the construction industry, 10% from financial services, and 4% from tourism, a major jump from Washington’s figures. In 2003 Daley maintained the traditional industries—construction, real estate, city contractors—from which his father drew the bulk of support, raising a third of his money there. However, he added another third of his funding from, “the businesses of the global economy – financial services, securities traders, corporate law firms, bankers, and international manufacturers” (Simpson et al. 2004). As far as electoral coalitions, Daley has drawn the vast majority of his support from White and Latino voters, although the African-American community has increased their support over the last few election cycles. Latinos have been

rewarded with more contracts and City Council seats, while blacks have dropped slightly. Daley, however, did solidify many of the legislative gains made by minorities under Washington’s government. All in all, this data about the political resources available to Daley further demonstrates his dominance of all policy arenas, not just Millennium Park. The increased political backing from the new global economy and tourist industry coincides well with the list of donors for the park. Those behind Daley’s elections and those who supported its construction come from the same group.

**Table 7: Millennium Park Resources Used**

	<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Social</b>
<b>John Bryan</b>	-Relationship with political leaders	-Previous involvement in arts/ cultural fundraising projects	-Close relationship with/ respect from Chicago’s elite in business and industry
<b>Richard Daley</b>	-Control over machinery of government -Growing electoral coalition	-Access to TIF funding -Campaign funding from varied sources	-Close relationship with Chicago’s economic elite -Strong individual reputation

**Criterion 4: Pathways of Influence**

In this section I examine exactly how the main actors exerted their influence, although that topic has already been covered in some detail, but more importantly assess the way groups outside of the major actors influenced and affected the process. The main pathway for John Bryan’s influence was controlling the private funding for Millennium Park, while the main pathway for Mayor Daley was the appointment and selection of those who would work on it, setting up the overall framework. As far as outside groups, the Chicago Tribune in particular was extremely critical of the project from the beginning, although for the most part it turned around. Several other newspapers played a role in covering the process. Some small homeowners groups

were able to block certain aspects of the project, and some minority groups engaged in protests to exert their influence.

### **John Bryan: Fundraiser**

Although John Bryan did not come up with the idea for Millennium Park nor actively seek out involvement, he became the most powerful man behind its creation. His influence did not come from lobbying the government, or stating his case in the media, it simply came from controlling the people who possessed the funds necessary to make his, and their, vision come true. Because of the nature of urban taxes and politics, Mayor Daley could not have completed the park without this funding. Thus when Bryan went to each family asking for money, he gave them nearly complete control over their section of the park, dramatically influencing the final product. The Pritzkers were able to deliver Gehry because they had the funds, and similarly with all other works of art. John Bryan, as a liaison between these givers and the ultimate approval of the Mayor, essentially used the purse strings to direct Millennium Park as he saw fit. In addition to him gaining influence by accessing these funds, the specific donors groups gained serious impact on the park by having their money available. They were able to contract sculptors and designers almost independent of oversight, and change these spaces as they saw fit. Thus it was not simply Bryan using them to promote his arts and culture objectives, but these elite actors also derived significant benefits for their money from this relationship. With structures such as the mid-sized Music and Dance Theater, Millennium Park began to look less and less like a park under these donors' influence (Gilfoyle 2006).

## **Richard M. Daley: Appointments and Oversight**

Daley's main pathway of influence came from his power to appoint people in charge of Millennium Park, and his overwhelming media presence. He chose his trusted advisor Ed Bedore to head up the project, and a close friend, John Bryan, to raise the private funds. Daley also pulled a Park District employee, Ed Uhlir, to serve as project manager and a liaison with the private sector involvement. In addition, he set up the management as a non-profit organization so that the future of the park would not become bogged down in city politics. In addition, Daley has widespread power in shaping the public perception of the Millennium Park project, as he is most frequently interviewed by major media outlets and holds press conferences. He was able to set off one major scandal by claiming that Frank Gehry was responsible for cost overruns, even though he could have easily just stated that the project had changed dramatically. Among other incidents, this false statement proves how powerful Daley's words can be in shaping media and public perception. Daley's role in the Millennium Park process has been covered extensively by national and international media, and he has become seen as a global leader on urban environmental and economic development issues (Gilfoyle 2006). In addition, he has also taken on the project of Chicago's bid for the 2016 Olympics, further cementing his international notoriety.

### **Media Coverage**

From the outset of the Millennium Park project the Chicago Tribune was immediately critical, portraying it as another example of a major public works project gone wrong. They published numerous stories on cost overruns, missed deadlines,

corruption and contracting scandals, and criticism of the use of TIF funding for the project. Other newspapers such as the Chicago Sun Times published similar reports, but around Chicago the Tribune became widely known as extremely critical of Millennium Park. They have always criticized Mayor Daley, and been skeptical of his continuation of some of his father's patronage policies. In the last two years, however, the tone of articles has changed dramatically from one of harsh critique to actually praising the success of the Millennium Park project. Architectural critic Blair Kamin (2005) has consistently published articles lauding the arts and cultural opportunities presented by Millennium Park. Hints of criticism remain, however, especially in their recent coverage of the different funding proposals for long-term maintenance. As previously mentioned, the national and international media has also published a wide range of studies praising Millennium Park as an example of urban development that works and suggesting that their local governments promote similar projects. Many international papers have recently published articles on tourism opportunities in Chicago, the stimulation of the Loop, real estate booming, and the beauty of the sculptures (Vancouver Sun 2005; Wong 2006). Overall the park has received extensive, nearly unanimously positive, support from international media outlets.

### **Other pathways of influence**

As far as the pathways for influence of secondary actors, several local groups have been able to affect and block certain aspects of the Millennium Park project they did not like. One recent example that stands out is the efforts of central loop businesses to block the creation of an extra property tax district to fund maintenance

of the park. They were able to use their clout with the mayor’s office and force him through lobbying efforts to find a new source of funds. The mayor promptly looked into it and discovered that a contract for bus terminals was producing excess funding and they could dip into this surplus. One major reason for this change is that the parking garage was not producing adequate revenue to cover all of the costs required (Chicago Tribune 2005, 22). In addition, several groups had conflicts with the height requirements put forth by the Montgomery Ward restrictions, so local residents were able to force the alteration of some aspects of the project.

There has been one major public protest surrounding the awarding of construction contracts for Millennium Park, but in this case the protestors did not actually exert much influence. The protest march was over a dearth of black contractors involved in the project. Although the protest received some coverage from the local media, it did not receive any from the city-wide media nor did it exert much influence on hiring practices. This protest pathway was clearly not effective for Millennium Park (Strausberg 2000).

**Table 8: Millennium Park Pathways of Influence**

<b>John Bryan/donors</b>	-Ability to raise funding - Power to contract sculptors and designers
<b>Richard Daley</b>	-Setting up overall framework of project -Ultimate decision-making authority
<b>Media</b>	-Critiquing cost and time overruns -Praise after completion for cultural aspects
<b>Protests</b>	-Attempting to change the use of city contractors -Blocking extra property tax district

### **Analysis of Criteria**

The purpose of this section is to directly compare the data I have gathered on the planning and execution of Millennium Park, falling under the four criteria, with the predictions made by each political theory. Similar to the organization of the data

section above, I go through each criterion in order and explain which theory or combination of theories best explains that process or outcome.

### **Dominant Actors/Concentration of Power**

Although a variety of actors influenced the Millennium Park process at different stages, and a much larger group of people actually worked on planning, strategy, and construction, the overwhelming influence of John Bryan and Richard Daley stands out above all else. In addition, the other major shapers of the project came from within or under one of their spheres of influence: no completely independent, third party individuals or corporation not under the purview of one of these two men played a central role in Millennium Park. John Bryan handled the financial and cultural side of the park, setting the funding strategy to give donors freedom to shape their park segments and thus responsible indirectly for almost all of the park's physical attributes. He also benefited from an extensive network of connections, whether personal, political, or business related, and was able to engage people from previous projects to work on Millennium Park. Daley was responsible for the idea of turning the unused land into a parking garage and open space, setting up the implementation infrastructure to obtain complete control, and drawing on his political clout to push the project through before any opposition could mobilize.

Elite theory provides the most powerful explanation for the policy outcome when looking at the dominant actors and concentration of power. A small number of elite actors had the ability to use the machinery of government and economy to further their personal—although they arguably wanted to benefit all citizens—desire to use this prime real estate to build the defining cultural institution of Chicago in the

21<sup>st</sup> century. These elite actors have worked together previously on other projects, in addition to using their personal status and reputation as political and economic tools. Regime theory and growth machine theory also provide some explanatory power, as the policy-making group included top business and government officials with mutual goals who have worked together on other projects. However, at the very top levels the concentration of power was in a few hands, not those of real estate developers, contractors, newspapers, or other NGOs. An urban regime generally implies a larger group of business leaders with similar interests, but in this case two leaders brought together people with divergent interests. Electoral theory could contribute, as Mayor Daley no doubt paid attention to the implications of Millennium Park on his candidacy, but he gave way to much too much power to Bryn Mawr to make this a purely political outcome. Also the local and city-wide City Council took little credit and had no dominant influence. Pluralist theory provides little help either, as power was not given to NGOs or neighborhood groups as was consciously concentrated by those in power.

### **Primary Goals**

Richard Daley had two major goals for the Millennium Park project: First, to create an inter-modal transportation link and revenue generating parking garage that would economically benefit the lakefront region. Secondly, he wanted this project to fit with his broader environmental goals, and return the unsightly railroad land to open space that could be enjoyed by all citizens of Chicago. He did not originally intend for such a massive and internationally renowned project, he simply wanted to provide economic development to the central loop while still meeting his

environmental objectives. John Bryan, however, had more ambitious goals. He wanted to make Millennium Park a gift of Chicago's elite at the time of the millennium and a symbol of the city's greatness by using the best available architects, sculptors, and planners. Another minor goal was to promote Chicago on the international tourism stage, "The Bilbao Effect" sought by many developers around the world. This was certainly not Bryan's primary goal, but it was shared by many of his donors. Although Bryan and Daley did not share all of their goals in common, and clashed at times, these represent overall the main objectives of Millennium Park. A variety of other actors had small goals, but they gained little influence.

Once again these goals are best explained by elite theory, especially John Bryan's desire to leave behind a personal legacy for the city, a goal that singularly allowed him to raise millions more than he ever expected. Daley wanted to promote his agenda of an inter-modal transportation site as well as establishing his personal reputation as a "builder mayor" and "green mayor". Encouraging central loop development is a broader goal, not personal to Daley, but achieving it, as well as cementing his reputation, will help further build his electoral coalition. In this way electoral theory also provides a strong explanation for Daley's goals on this project. Growth machine theory also provides some explanation, as Daley and Bryan—as well as the donors—all had economic goals for this land. Indeed, looking at the outcome, Millennium Park has spurred numerous new developments and regeneration projects in the central loop. Thus, although they may not have directly stated this goal, growth machine theory provides a strong explanation for the outcome. Regime theory also provides help, as this was clearly a policy favorable to business growth in Chicago,

and intended as such. Mayor Daley also intentionally excluded groups such as the Chicago Park District from having influence, in direct opposition to pluralist theory, and fitting with regime theory. Once again elite theory and regime theory provide the best explanation for Millennium Park.

### **Resources Used**

The resources used for Millennium Park reveal a more complicated picture than the dominant actors or primary goals. In fitting with elite theory, John Bryan used his personal reputation and background extensively when raising money for Millennium Park. In addition, Richard Daley's plan generated such little opposition primarily because he has a reputation for getting what he wants done and generally crushing any opponents. Because of this no one presented any strong challenge his proposal, aside from the Chicago Tribune, who has the background, resources, and independence that allow for this criticism without negative consequences. In addition, Bryan and Daley were able to harness any resources necessary for their project, whether economic or personnel-wise, in particular Daley had access to the city's TIF money, something available to no other actor. Regime theory also provides an excellent explanation for the use of resources, as the Millennium Park project took advantage of support from the top levels of government, as well as an extensive network of potential donors and supporters. This network of power at the top is central to regime theory, and was clearly evident from the diverse, but powerful, network of backers both on Millennium Park's founders list but also to Mayor Daley's campaigns. Thus although these actors did not have direct influence, their use of money reveals the existence of a powerful urban regime. Electoral theory

provides some explanation in a similar vein, as many of Daley's political donors overlap with those who gave money to John Bryan for Millennium Park. His donors expect him to continue the "builder mayor" and "green mayor" trends he fulfilled with Millennium Park, and Daley listened. However, Daley did not draw upon any Democratic political networks, making electoral theory incomplete.

Once again pluralist theory provides little help, as there was no collective will of community groups or monetary influence from interest groups behind the project. Growth machine theory, considered by some a type of urban regime, also provides some explanation, as the project's success drew upon Daley's political capital as well as private donations from many typical growth machine interests. However, the growth machine groups did not monetarily dominate the project, as many cultural and other type of foundations not traditionally associated has a pervasive influence. The money for Millennium Park came mostly from arts and general business individuals and groups, not specifically real estate or development. Daley has traditionally drawn upon these groups in his campaigns, however, although much less so than his father. All in all regime theory provides the best explanation, in this case a regime populated by Mayor Daley, his electoral coalition, and the leaders of Chicago's pre-eminent business and cultural foundations.

### **Pathways for Influence**

The pathways for influence in Millennium Park once again reveal that elite theory and regime theory provide the best explanations for this development. Traditional growth machine methods: planning organizations, media, and land purchase; had some use, but overall Daley circumvented the traditional planning

process, was blasted by the media, and already owned the land. Elite theory predicts extensive project exposure in national and international media owing to the individual actors' status, something seen in Millennium Park. Daley and Bryan also had access to, and used, any means necessary to achieve goals, another prediction of elite theory. Regime theory has similar predictions, with access to top level political decisions the primary factor. In addition, the use of private funding, channeled through the public sector to finance major cultural institutions or development projects is a key indicator of an urban regime. Electoral theory also provides significant explanatory power for the Millennium Park process, as Daley used his ability to hand out contracts for the building process to support one of his main campaign contributors. In addition, he was able to appoint—or exclude—specific government actors from being involved in the project. Finally, he used TIF funding, a pathway he had access to specifically because of his government position. Once again pluralist theory provides little explanation.

### **Overall**

Overall the Millennium Park political process indicates that an urban regime governed by Mayor Richard Daley and supplemented by John Bryan has control over the development process in Chicago. In all four criteria elite theory and regime theory provide the most powerful explanation. Both actors relied heavily on their personal reputations to gain political support for the project or gain monetary support, as John Bryan did. Leaving behind a legacy was a main goal for Bryan and his donors, and Daley wanted to fulfill his political reputation of being a “builder mayor” and a “green mayor”. He also exhibited full control of the machinery of government

and placed himself in charge by removing the Chicago Park District from the project and using TIF funding. All in all, Millennium Park represents a style of urban development both new and evident in many other cases. The regime differs from the traditional growth machine, as Daley and Bryan both have many more complex interests in mind than simply economic growth. This style of urban development reflects a political process dominated by one central, powerful actor, acting based on the interests of his constituency and reputation, and united with business leaders. Daley needed business and private interests to fund this project, reflecting the presence of an elite regime currently in charge of development. However, this regime does not have growth as its central goal, it wants growth of cultural and environmental institutions as well as just jobs, and a true improvement in the quality of life in Chicago.

**Table 9: Millennium Park Best Explanatory Theories**

<b>Dominant Actors/ Concentration of Power</b>		<b>Primary Goals</b>	<b>Resources Used</b>	<b>Pathways of Influence</b>
1)	Elite theory	Elite theory	Regime theory	Elite theory
2)	Regime theory	Electoral theory	Growth machine theory	Regime theory
3)	Growth machine theory	Regime theory	Electoral theory	Electoral theory

## **Chapter Four: London's 2012 Olympic Park**

### **The Story from Start to Finish**

To provide some continuity, I have attempted to tell the story of London's Olympic Park in the same way I told that of Millennium Park. I start by describing a bit of the historical context: the Olympic Park sprung out of the long term socio-economic changes I described in the introduction, and a mayor with green ideals who oversees a new political system that emphasizes planning and development. Like Daley, he needed help—in this case from a diverse group of Bid Committees and Olympic Boards, described in detail in the dominant actors section—to make this project happen, and through these alliances he both benefited and was forced to make sacrifices. In addition to history and structure of the project, I also provide an overview of funding—in this case mostly public. Finally, I give an overview of opposition and conflict, important features of the Olympic Park political process almost non-existent in Chicago. After that, I proceed with discussion of my criteria and analysis as for London's Olympic Park.

Similar to Chicago, in many ways the Olympic Park also began with the influence of a strong mayor, when Ken Livingstone and the GLA published the London Plan in 2004—the first long-term strategic planning effort for the capital in several decades. The Plan tabbed East London in particular, as well as several other boroughs, as areas in need of economic development (Mayor of London). The London Plan outlined a program of regeneration intent on making London prosperous and accessible to all, not just providing economic benefits. It prominently includes social, environmental, and cultural goals, reflecting the influence of Livingstone's

goals for the city. Because of the results of the London Plan, transportation planning and infrastructure funding was already committed to East London, and Livingstone just had to find a centerpiece for the project, said to be the biggest and most important in London for the next century. Without the creation of the GLA and the election of Livingstone in 2000, the London Plan may never have gotten off the ground in the first place. Therefore, the creation of the Olympic Park can be traced back to political factors outlined in detail in my overview of London's political history. The GLA was created to fill the strategic planning void and provide direction to the city's growth, exactly the task undertaken in East London. Similar to Millennium Park, it started out as an empty, environmentally degraded site, with various proposals coming forth to clean up and regenerate this area. The Olympic Park also grew in many ways Livingstone had probably never intended for his redevelopment project, reflecting the diverse influence of political actors, the resources available, and their various goals.

In contrast to Millennium Park, however, the legislation behind London's Olympic Park began in the national government. Debate started in Parliament in early 2003, with the July 15<sup>th</sup> bid deadline on the horizon, and in May Cabinet Minister for Culture, Media, and Sport Tessa Jowell announced that the government would officially support a London bid. London 2012 unveiled its first plans for the Games on January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2004. The original bid document prominently displayed the new Olympic Park, to be, "set amid a revitalised network of waterways within 1,500 acres stretching from Hackney Marshes down to the Thames, and forming one of the biggest urban parks ever laid out in Europe." In addition, it linked this park to regeneration benefits, stating, "The Olympic Park will be established as part of the

regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley which will encompass the most extensive transformation seen in London for more than a century” (London 2012). The plan also set out initial financing strategies, with an anticipated 17 billion in total transportation spending already set before 2012, and 450 million more set aside if they won the bid. As far as general funding, the Mayor’s office only committed 20 million pounds initially, with 1.5 billion of the 2.375 billion in national funding set to come from the Lottery, 625 million from taxes, and 250 million from the London Development Agency. As far as private funding, it was mentioned briefly, with the expectation of generating only 5-12 million pounds (London 2012). After finding out in May of 2004 London had advanced to the final five Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as other top Olympic officials, set out to spread the word around the globe. Hundreds of thousands of residents registered their names with London 2012 to express support.

Despite the widespread support, the Olympic Park suffered from many of the typical problems for any multi-billion dollar development project, unlike Millennium Park, which escaped mostly unscathed. Local groups protested against building venues in their neighborhoods, or not building venues in their neighborhoods. Some argued that their borough was not receiving enough of the development money, and that too much was being poured into one specific location. Many argued that the track record of past Olympics suffered from inevitable costs overruns, cut corners environmentally, and rushed projects to finish on time. Generally, they claimed, this led to a failure to meet original development goals. Their arguments also stated that the leaders were simply doing this for personal political benefit and glory, and the

stadiums, housing, and transport links would see little or no activity after the Games. Overall, these protests all centered on the argument that the government was trying to force the Olympic Park to fit the redevelopment needs faced by East London, and they would be better off spending this money without its constraints (BBC Sport). Specific demands come with the Olympic Games that are not perfectly aligned with the development needs of Livingstone and the London Plan, such as extensive spending on a media center. Making the East London development centerpiece an Olympic Park project, however, allowed Livingstone to incorporate his green ideals and get access to easy and plentiful funding.

These neighborhood and interest coalitions, which included many environmental minded groups, have continued to pressure the organizing committee and achieved significant victories (BBC Sport). Although the Olympic Park would certainly be one way to fulfill the goals of the London Plan, was tying this redevelopment to the bureaucracy and extra needs of the Olympics really a good idea? On July 6<sup>th</sup>, 2005 when the IOC voted to select London as the host of the 2012 Olympics, the other options suddenly went out the window, and groups stepped up their efforts to influence the Olympic Park.

Because the Olympic Park was so tied up in the Olympics, however, Livingstone could not have as much personal power as Daley did over Millennium Park; he was forced to submit to the authority of many committees and individuals. The London Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG)—chaired by Coe—and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA)—led by Chief Executive David Higgins—will combine with London 2012 Board members Jowell, Livingstone, and

British Olympic Association head Colin Moynihan to make the Olympic Park happen. While LOCOG is responsible for the marketing and business side, the ODA is charged with acquiring the land, constructing venues, and making sure everything is on schedule: the real nuts and bolts work that will determine the nature of East London's park. The ODA has a much more detailed budget, as they are set to spend about half a billion dollars on the brand new Olympic Stadium in East London. According to the BBC, the national government will spend 1.6 billion on re-development in the Lower Lea Valley—the Olympic Park area—while also investing seven billion in new transport solutions for London. Much of the funding for the Games will still come from a new Olympic Lottery, while the LDA will be expected to supply about 500 million dollars and a new tax on all London citizens of at least 50 dollars per person will contribute 1.2 billion. A multitude of budget increases even within the first year have alarmed many taxpayers (BBC Sport). Media outlets such as the BBC and the famous tabloid journals have always pointed a critical eye towards the government—often much more so than in the US, but now with costs continuing to escalate their criticisms are becoming more vocal as well. The media criticisms in London have mirrored those leveled against Millennium Park by the Chicago Tribune.

Unlike Millennium Park, however, the city encountered political challenges related to purchasing the site itself. Several major conflicts flared in December, shortly after construction began on the Olympic Park. The debate centered on “compulsory purchase orders”—similar to the power of eminent domain in the US—as the LDA was given legal right to purchase land from businesses and homeowners,

forcing them to vacate the site, even if they could not reach an acceptable deal (BBC 2006). In addition, as the construction proceeds on the Olympic Park area and the venues, open space, and transport links begin to take shape, LOCOG and the ODA have left behind many interest groups that have the expertise and willingness to contribute. Many local residents and environmental groups feel that this development is being forced upon them, as a union between top-level political decision makers, businesses, and construction companies. The lead groups have stressed the environment from the beginning, and are making open space the central point of their economic development, but some fear the green flavor to development may fall off, as it is not vital to the hosting of the Olympics. The Olympic Park still has five and half years before its completion, and many decades before East London will see its full effects. Overall, however, the politics behind this open space development have already played out in a fascinating manner.

### **Criterion 1: Dominant Actors/Concentration of Power**

When trying to break down the politics behind London's Olympic Park in a similar way to Chicago in order to flesh out the real key power brokers, the results are not as clear cut. However, upon closer inspection, the power structures appear quite similar. Ken Livingstone, like Mayor Daley, represented the mayor's office, and had the power to access machinery of government to promote his project, in this case the power to purchase land and access development agencies. He just needed the money. His "John Bryan" came in the form of Sebastian Coe, Tessa Jowell, and the Olympic Games. Similar to Daley and Bryan, both sets of actors had control over their sphere of influence, choosing subordinates who would not challenge their power. Overall,

however, in London the power was overall a bit more dispersed. I first outline Livingstone's side, followed by Coe/Jowell's side, and finally their oversight.

Ken Livingstone has been a long-time proponent of development funds for East London, especially since their identification in the London Plan, and is the final member of the oversight board of London 2012. Livingstone has been involved in city politics his entire life, from the time he was first elected in 1971 to the Lambeth Council from the Labour Party, to his Leader position on the Greater London Council until Margaret Thatcher dissolved it in 1986, to his election as Mayor of London in 2000—as an independent—and 2004, once again a member of the Labour Party (BBC 2003). As Mayor of London, his main duties are, “to promote economic development and wealth creation, social development, and the improvement of the environment.” In pursuit of these goals, Livingstone heads Transport for London (TfL), appoints members of the London Development Agency (LDA), a powerful actor in the Olympic process that committed 250 million dollars, and has created the London Plan—a long term strategic plan for the city that focuses on economic development. The Plan is often cited as the reason the London bid committee chose to locate most of its economic development funds in East London, as it was tabbed as the area most in need (London 2012). The LDA, as well as TfL, have played key roles in delivering funds and the economic development expertise necessary for delivering the Games. According to the BBC (2003), “Long before he made the break with Labour to run for mayor, he was a dissident whose refusal to toe the party line won his popularity on the streets of London and beyond.” Livingstone has taken outspoken and controversial positions on numerous issues throughout his career, from

forcing drivers to pay to enter central London to opposing the Iraq war to bashing anyone who criticizes him. In general, however, the public and several powerful politicians, including Tony Blair, respect his forthright nature and continued election to public office (BBC 2003). His role in the Olympic campaign has been one of self-interest for the most part, and he has favored all along using the Games as a development tool for East London. In the mayor's office he focuses mainly on transportation and environmental issues, and Livingstone recognizes the potential to obtain national government funding to solve some of the capital's major problems. He often complains about the tax deficit of money taken from Londoners and distributed to the rest of the country, and Livingstone sees this as an opportunity to take some of it back. A charismatic leader with a commitment above all to the environment—he has frequently called global warming the most important issue facing the current generation—his presence as a member of the Olympic board seems to ensure environmental issues will not be forgotten (BBC 2003). It seems like Livingstone was partly forced to allow the Olympic Park to be his centerpiece for East London as it was the only way to support his green ideals and still receive massive public funding. He has been frustrated with the government's lack of development funding and support for his past projects, such as Crossrail—a transport link between East and Central London—but Livingstone finally found a way to have the government support his goals. Like Daley, who had personal control over advisors and organizations that carried out his projects, Livingstone was able to set up powerful roles for the LDA and TfL. He was forced to cede large amounts of power and control to LOCOG and the ODA, but Livingstone has become so involved in the

Olympic process that he has a lot of control over these organizations as well, making him a dominant mayor in a similar fashion to Daley.

In order to obtain these development funds for East London, and have it happen in a sustainable fashion, Livingstone allied with the government, business, and sporting elites responsible for making the major decisions behind the Park. After several months of debate, the government, led by Tony Blair and Department of Culture, Media and Sport head Tessa Jowell—a major political figure on the national stage—decided to offer 2.375 billion pounds, about 4.5 billion dollars, in support of the bid. Like Daley's alliance with Bryan, Livingstone became involved in the Olympics not because of his passion for the Games, but mainly because he knew they could deliver the funding. The other sphere dominated the Bid and planning process, but like Daley, Livingstone has maintained input. As Olympic Minister since 2005, Jowell has perhaps the most important government role for delivering the Games, and she will ultimately answer to the public if expenditures get out of hand. The current LOCOG board makes up a cross section of business, sport, and political leaders in London. Sebastian Coe and Keith Mills serve as Chairman and Vice Chairman, with the Princess Royal also serving also a representative of the royal family, and Charles Allen focusing on business and media issues (London 2012). Coe, one of the greatest athletes in British history, entered politics shortly after his career in athletics ended, serving as a Conservative MP from 1992-1997, and the Private Secretary to Conservative Leader William Hague (London 2012). He has a dynamic, popular personality, which along with his international athletics fame has gained Coe many business and political alliances around the world. Mills brings an extensive and well-

respected marketing and business career to LOCOG, one of the most vital aspects of building coalitions and generating public and private sector support for the Games (Loyalty Management Group). Allen, another business actor, has experience in a variety of industries, but his primary success has come in media, serving for a period as Chief Executive of one of Britain's two largest media companies (ITV). The LOCOG board also includes a wide variety of other actors from the elite levels of sport, business, and local government. They have combined to make the major marketing, strategy, and delivery decisions behind the 2012 Olympics (London 2012). Although LOCOG is not as important to the nuts-and-bolts planning and development, its leaders have been most prominently involved in winning, appointing other individuals, obtaining funding, and setting the overall strategy and goals for London's hosting of the Games

The ODA, however, makes the important decisions on the ground in terms of land use that affects environmental impact and the nature of economic development. The board of directors consists of 14 members. David Higgins, the Chief Executive, has previously served as Chief Executive of the national government's development agency, as well as leading international property agencies (London 2012). The other members include media magnates, local development agency heads, urban renewal experts, transportation and hospitality industry leaders, and several local government leaders.

### **Other actors and interest groups**

Once again, similar to Chicago, most of the secondary actors fall under direct control of the primary actors, who because of their positions of power and influence

were able to gain complete control of the development process. The LDA and TfL both have significant amounts of control over how the development infrastructure is planned and managed, but they fall under the mayor’s office. Livingstone, as well as Tessa Jowell of the national government, has significant authority over the Olympic planning boards because of their presence on the oversight board for the Olympic Games. Because of their connections and reputations, Coe, Mills, Allen, and the other Olympic planning board leaders have chosen business, political, and sporting elites to sit on these boards, allowing them to make the major development decisions. However, as discussed in the introduction, in the earlier planning stages of the Olympic Park environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fund had a significant impact in shaping the nature of this open space development. All in all, the most powerful actors and concentration of power in the Olympic Park development in East London flow downwards from Ken Livingstone and the leaders of the Olympic Boards, incorporating individuals from London’s political and economic elite as well as interest groups who fit their objectives. Looking at the goals of these different actors will help determine exactly what their political objectives are and why they became involved in this project.

**Table 10: London’s Olympic Park Dominant Actors**

<b>First Bidding Stage</b>	<b>Second Bidding Stage</b>	<b>LOCOG</b>	<b>ODA</b>	<b>Oversight board</b>
-BOA -National government (Tessa Jowell)	-Business elites (Charles Allen, Keith Mills, Barbara Cassani) -Sporting elites (Sebastian Coe, Alan Pascoe) -Political elites (Ken Livingstone, Tony Blair)	-Sporting elites (Sebastian Coe) -Business elites (Keith Mills) -Local government leaders	-Leaders of development agencies -Media/arts/tourism/hospitality executives -Political figures	-Ken Livingstone -Sebastian Coe -Tessa Jowell -Colin Moynihan

## **Primary Goals**

Similar to Millennium Park, the primary goals for London's Olympic Park can be divided up by actor. It is difficult to look at outcomes for the Olympic Park, however, since the project is still many years from completion. However, the goals are clearer, since the leaders of the different organizations have all stated them up front. They fall into two major categories: First, economic development—including jobs for construction companies during the Games, as well as housing, tourism, jobs, and infrastructure benefits for East London after. Secondly, social benefits—including cleaning up the existing environment, having low carbon emissions, providing venues for the youth of east London, and reintegrating East London into the capital. Livingstone is mainly focused on long-term benefits, including the regeneration potential, environmental clean up, and social goals, while the Olympic actors are focused on short-term goals, including economic benefits of construction and having post-Olympics sports venues. This is because their overarching goal is to win and stage the Olympics, and they have adopted many of Livingstone's goals when it was politically beneficial to the Bid. It will be easier to break the goals into economic development and social categories, rather than dividing by actor as with Millennium Park, since London's are much more intertwined.

## **Economic Development Goals**

For Ken Livingstone, the main reason for creating the Olympic Park in east London is to regenerate one of the poorest areas in the United Kingdom. According to London 2012, "Three of the Host Boroughs contain the third, fourth, and eleventh most deprived wards in the country." In an attempt to convince the national

government to support the Olympics in London, however, the Olympic committees have argued that economic development would come to the entire city and country. One of the prime arguments behind this was construction contracts, since firms all over the UK would be able to bid and win these massive contracts for transportation and infrastructure, improving their economies as well. In addition to construction benefits, many firms hope the Games will also increase the UK's international profile, leading to increased tourism throughout the country, but particularly to east London—Livingstone's main goal. These claims of economic benefit have not only been a primary goal of Olympic committee leaders partly because they have helped convince local and national business figures to back the Olympic bid.

To the southeast of London, particularly Kent and Sussex, firms have already praised the potential impact, with the BBC reporting, "30,000 new jobs will be created in the county, which neighbours London, and that a million people will visit Kent." In addition, however, Olympic leaders have stressed the economic benefits in east London, with Coe claiming, "The Games will do great things for the quality of life in east London, sparking the biggest urban regeneration programme in over 100 years and bringing many thousands of new jobs" (BBC 2006). Although it will be nearly impossible to quantify these particular impacts until after the Games, Olympic committee leaders have made them a major goal because the environment and development aspects fit with the IOC's mission and helped them win the Bid. Livingstone has been arguing, backed by the London Plan, for billions to be spent on transportation infrastructure and the government to build thousands of apartments and houses that the private sector may never have delivered in East London. By helping

bring the Olympic Park to East London he can achieve these goals. An economic impact study by PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated the magnitude on tourism and current business, infrastructure, and new business for London and the UK. The expected numbers are skewed much more towards the city as a whole than specifically east London, with 525 million pounds of benefit expected in the east (Livingstone's goal) as compared to 5.9 billion in the city as a whole. The study also finds 1.9 billion in benefit for the rest of the UK (Olympic committee's goal). In addition, the city will see about 623 million in infrastructure benefits, 244 in tourism—compared to 519 for the whole UK—and 439 in new business creation (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005). London has a well-developed infrastructure plan based on an actual previous strategic planning effort, suggesting these goals may be achievable, and not simply leave behind “white elephants”. The Games will also leave behind several converted athletic venues that will be transformed into educational and business centers for east London unrelated to sport, fitting with Livingstone's objectives (BBC Sport). Unlike Millennium Park, the economic goals were stated much more up front for the Olympic Park, but like Millennium, the goals of the two spheres of actors are mutually beneficial. Livingstone wants to regenerate a poor area, and knew the Olympic leaders could use that goal, along with more country-wide benefits, to win the Games.

### **Social Goals**

Livingstone and the Olympic committee members have also pointed to social benefits as a major reason for using this type of development to regenerate East London. With the widening economic gap between rich and poor, as well as the

concentration of ethnic minorities in economically depressed areas, leaders have decided to target what they see as the most significant development project of the century on one of the most disadvantaged parts of London. This was the major objective behind the London Plan. The Olympic committee supports this park project in part because they can get land there cheaply and easily for venues, but also because they will be used after the Games by the area's youth. In this way social goals also encompasses both the environmental and sport categories. Olympic committee leaders want people in East London to have access to the same athletic amenities as people in the rest of the city, and hope that by providing these world-class facilities right in their neighborhood a thriving sport-oriented community will develop. In addition, East London is one of the most environmentally degraded parts of the city, making citizens feel like the government has neglected their welfare. By providing them with a massive park, Livingstone hopes will not only provide the social benefits of different economic and social groups interacting, but also make them feel like more important and respected members of the overall London community (Mayor of London).

### **Sport Goals**

The second major goal of the Olympic committee, in addition to economic benefits, is generating social, economic, and health benefits through the promotion of sports in east London. With so many athletics figures at the head of Olympic planning organizations, it is no doubt they have pointed to hosting of the Games as a chance to return UK athletics to the glory days in the 1980s. Sporting infrastructure will see a huge boost during and after the Games. The Lower Lea Valley will be

turned into the London Olympic Institute, using sport, recreation, and open space to build community in east London. The main venues left behind will be a 25,000 seat athletics center, a 3,500 seat aquatics center, a network of bicycle stadiums and paths, and a hockey center. These venues will be located directly in the heart of east London, and Olympic leaders have continually pointed to their potential for job creation as well as social benefits to the local community (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005). While this is primarily a goal of the Olympic committee, Livingstone also shares it because it overlaps with his regeneration goals.

### **Environmental Goals**

From the beginning the most powerful actors in the London Olympic effort have pointed to sustainable development as one of their biggest goals, the Olympic committee because it helped them win the bid and Livingstone because it fits with his ideals and development goals for East London. The former prefers environmental goals associated with the Games themselves, while Livingstone is focused on long-term impacts.

The Olympic committees have focused on sustainable development, including the creation of an environmental steering group comprised of relevant government agencies and NGO's and the production of the first "One Planet" Olympics. The first measure seems like it could divert responsibility for delivering environmental results from LOCOG and shift it to other already overworked organizations, and has prompted questions about the commitment to these principles. The broad strategy that this group will be implementing, called One Planet Living, has been pioneered by a partnership between the World Wildlife Fund and local consulting firm

BioRegional. This strategy draws on the traditional arguments for sustainable development, and presents four goals for the Games: low carbon, zero waste, conserving biodiversity, and promoting environmental awareness and partnerships. Each of these initiatives will ideally guide every aspect of the Games, as outlined in the Candidate File. One hundred percent of spectators will use public transport to reduce carbon emissions, a sustainable procurement policy will guide construction materials purchases, a new urban park will be created to enhance biodiversity, and annual clean-up projects will engage the community. Olympic leaders have all spoken about the importance of this plan (London 2012).

According to Mayor Ken Livingstone, and his main environmental goal, “The prize for hosting the 2012 Games will be to transform one of the most derelict and disadvantaged parts of Europe into a revitalised, sustainable, new urban quarter fit for the 21st century.” This goal is shared by Olympic committee member Jowell, who said, “The Olympic Park provides a huge window to the world to show the UK living up to its promises and responsibilities for the Games and beyond into a socially, economically and environmentally sustainable legacy.” According to the ODA’s Sustainable Development Strategy, “Ultimately we hope that the ODA’s Sustainable Development Strategy can act as a catalyst for industry to deliver an improvement in the economic, social and environmental sustainability of development across the UK” (ODA Sustainable Development Strategy). Looking at the strategy, the rhetoric, and the procedures that have been put in place by top Olympic leaders, they are more concerned with a sustainable games, while Livingstone wants to make an environmental development example in East London.

## Goals of other actors

Similar to Millennium Park, the goals of other actors mostly fall under the shadow of Ken Livingstone or the Olympic committees. TfL and the ODA obviously want to promote public transportation and encourage East London development, respectively. The business and sport interests under the Olympic committees are looking for economic and athletic benefits. Some actors that fit into other categories are construction companies bidding for contracts that are looking to gain a short-term monetary benefit out of the Games. Other firms as well, including environmental ones, also have the goal of acquiring contracts and benefiting financially, as well as promoting the objectives of their interest groups. Groups such as the WWF have achieved this, but many are currently struggling. Also similar to Chicago, media and news interests are capitalizing on the chance to cover this major news story and expand their readerships.

**Table 11: London's Olympic Park Primary Goals**

<b>Economic Development Goals</b>	-Livingstone: Regenerate one of the capital's poorest areas by improving infrastructure -Olympic committees: Jobs for national construction companies -Olympic committees: Increased national tourism revenue
<b>Social Goals</b>	-L: Narrow gap between London's rich and poor -L: Provide development funds in a minority area -L/OC: Integrate East London into the capital
<b>Sport</b>	-OC: Redevelop the British sporting tradition -L/OC: Transform East London into a sporting center of the capital -OC: Stage the best Olympic Games ever
<b>Environmental</b>	-L: Improve public transportation -L: Serve as an example of sustainable development -L/OC: Have a zero-carbon emission Games

## Resources Used

Similar to Millennium Park, the main resources used for the Olympic Park are obviously economic, but following where the money will specifically come from reveals several interesting facts about the nature of urban development in the UK.

The other major resources for the leaders of the Games are political, as actors have the ability to access the machinery of government. This means they have the power to purchase land at will, call on experts, and push favorable bills through government. Social resources are also important, although with most of the funding being public, they are not nearly as significant. Like the divide between Bryan and Daley, the Olympic committee's resources are mostly economic, while Livingstone's are mostly political. However, there is more overlap for London's Olympic Park than Millennium Park, making it easier to consider the resources individually rather than the actors.

#### **LOCOG and the ODA, Livingstone: Economic Resources**

The Olympic Park itself had an initial cost estimate of 2.375 billion pounds, financed almost exclusively through public funding. About 1.5 billion of that total would come from the National Lottery, normally used to finance public improvements and other similar projects. There would be new Lottery games created for the specific purpose of funding the Olympics. This will be a national fundraising effort that is sold throughout the entire United Kingdom. In addition to that substantial chunk of money, about 625 million will come from an increased Council Tax on Londoners. This total amounts to adding about 20 pounds onto every citizen's bill every year for up to 12 years if necessary. Olympic committee leaders such as Tessa Jowell control all of these resources. The government also plans to use the London Development Agency for about 250 million pounds of total funding. This is one of the major economic resources coming from Livingstone's domain. The agency, with an annual budget of about 400 million, generally works to promote

economic development projects through partnerships with public and private organizations. It will continue to seek out those alliances as its budget and power increase with its 2012 responsibilities (LDA; Cameron McKenna). These figures relate specifically to the Olympic Park, and do not account for the massive government and private sector investment in transportation and other infrastructure projects in the region. The Olympic committees have access to these billions of dollars which Livingstone had a difficult time getting his hands on before tying development in East London to the Olympic Park. The regeneration will be funded not just from the pockets of London taxpayers, but from those around the UK as a whole. These costs are being added as the process moves along, with the most recent a 900 million pound increase in the total cost of the Olympic Park as of November, 2006, with the budget now set at 3.3 billion. This cost increase comes mainly from the hiring of a delivery partner, the revelation that the construction will require the payment of a Value Added Tax to the EU, increased materials costs, and the decision to construct 35,000 more homes near the Olympic Park site (Cameron McKenna). Some say the increased costs of regeneration could push total costs up 1.5-2 billion pounds, funding ODA CEO David Higgins has chosen to once again seek from the national government. The new budget will have to be agreed upon by the Department of Culture, Media, and Sport as well as the Treasury in order to provide the additional funds (ODA). The economic resources for Millennium Park are mostly from the Olympic committee members, which Livingstone has taken advantage of.

### **Livingstone, Olympic committee members: Political/Social Resources**

Livingstone and many of the other committee members have the social resource of close relationships with top actors in business and government, as well as access to political resources in the form of the tools of government. Because of these connections, many government figures have also been outspoken in their public support. Tony Blair in particular led the way in supporting the bid at the highest levels of government, even traveling to Singapore several days early during the final days of voting to provide some last minute lobbying. This support also extends across party lines, with both the Conservative and Labour parties well represented on the LOCOG and ODA boards. Livingstone and Coe in particular have many close allies because of their strong individual reputations, bringing leaders from development, business, and sport on board with their goals.

One of the most striking representations of the political resources possessed by the Olympic committee in London is the passage of the Olympics bill and the wide range of powers given to the ODA by the national government (London 2012). The bill not only set up the ODA and gave it the responsibility for delivering the Games, it also provided financing through the National Lottery, the power to forcefully kick people off their land so that venues could be built, exclusive rights to marketing names, and the ability to prosecute ticket scalpers. Currently several MPs have become critical of the ODA's cost overruns, and are threatening to block any measure designed to finance the cost increases with money from the national government (London 2012). In addition to the extensive political support that granted the ODA

these powers, public support is still very strong even though many believe costs will continue to increase in the next few months.

Livingstone's popularity and reputation for doing the right thing should be credited a lot with providing this political resource. In a survey conducted in November 2006, 69% of respondents expressed their support of the Games in spite of the fact that 79% believed costs would continue to go up. 45% approved of the job the top organizations were doing, while 37% disapproved. In addition, although 69% believe that costs should be borne equally by London and outside of London taxpayers, 65% believe these costs will be incurred only by those living in London. These results reveal that even though the people of London have some misgivings about cost, they still provide a solid political base of support for the Olympic committees. In addition, people also expressed their level of support for different goals of the Games, asked both if the goals would be achieved and whether they justify the cost. Over 80% believed increased tourism, regeneration of east London, better sports facilities, and increased employment would succeed, but of all the options, regeneration of east London was the only goal over 50% of respondents believed justified the costs. This provides an indication that political support and will exists to carry out regeneration in this manner, surprising considering the failure of so many projects in the past (BBC Survey, 2006). Livingstone has been key to this support, as he is traditionally seen as somebody who does not fear opposing the government, and will make sure projects are done on time and goals are met. Economic resources are mainly with the Olympic committee, as well as political resources and some social, while Livingstone relies mainly on his social and political

resources. These discrepancies have in many ways created the partnership behind this open space development project, as they did for Chicago.

**Table 12: London’s Olympic Park Resources Used**

<b>Economic Resources</b>	-Funding support from national government -Increased taxes on London citizens -Development funding for transportation and infrastructure
<b>Political Resources</b>	-Support of Tony Blair and Ken Livingstone for Bid -Power to purchase necessary land -Support of London’s citizens for Games -Ability to push bills through government

### **Pathways of Influence**

Similar to the way I outlined the story for Chicago, the pathways of influence for London’s Olympic Park can also be divided up by actor. Mayor Ken Livingstone’s primary pathway of influence was through his presence as a member of the Olympic oversight board to direct policy, his control over the machinery of government, and his power of appointments. Because of this vast network of political support, the Olympic committees have multiple pathways through which to achieve their objectives, especially the power to form partnerships, purchase land, and access funds. In addition, smaller interest groups can mainly get their voices heard by working through the ODA, but they can also access the media by protesting and speaking out. Finally, the media: local, national, and international; plays a major role in shaping the public perception and success of this project. Once again I focus on secondary actors and the media in this section, both of whom played a larger role in London than in Chicago.

### **Ken Livingstone: Political Leader**

London Mayor Ken Livingstone has a major source of power and pathway of influence in directing the Olympic development process because of his leadership of

Transport for London, his ability to appointment members of the London Development Agency, and his presence as a member of the Olympic board. Through this board he can oversee and determine the composition of LOCOG and the ODA. He has the machinery of government at his fingertips, and the power of appointment means in these organizations that will determine exactly what type of development occurs, how much money is spent, and where it goes. Livingstone can also surround himself with allies that support his sustainable development policies. In addition, he has control over the Mayor's office and Greater London Authority giving the Olympic committees access to police, fire, infrastructure, and regeneration tools.

### **LOCOG and the ODA: Partnerships, Purchasing, and Funding**

Above all, the diverse composition of the LOCOG and ODA boards from a wide variety of industries, political spheres, and development agencies means that these organizations can exercise control over a vast network of resources when they see fit. From the top levels of government and sport to agencies such as the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, decision makers such as Seb Coe have strategically filled these boards in order to provide themselves maximum cohesion and control over the entire development process. The pathway of appointment and alliance with public and private organizations has served as a major mechanism of influence for LOCOG and the ODA. In addition, the ODA has been granted the extremely controversial power to purchase land at will for use in its development efforts. They have used this legal pathway as a dominant mechanism, buying out businesses and forcing residents to move. The use of this pathway in major economic development projects is debated often on the international stage and among London

legal experts, but for now the ODA has this power. Finally, Olympic committee members such as Tessa Jowell are involved in national government politics, helping obtain and distribute funding. While the national government has ultimate control over the money, they have significant overlap with the Olympic committees who determine how this money is spent.

### **Media Coverage**

The media has played an important role in the development process behind the Olympic Park, both in publicizing the process and criticizing claims made by leaders and cost overruns. Several of the board member of LOCOG and the ODA are heavily involved in the media industry, having served as executives of major television networks, and because of this the organizations are planning on making the 2012 Games the most extensively covered around the world. These partnerships have allowed media outlets to gain unprecedented access to the development process, even for the UK. The tabloid style of journalism there differs greatly from the United States, with personal lives of top politicians and business leaders always fair game in the mainstream media. This investigative journalism also tends to uncover and publicize scandal much more efficiently and frequently than the US media, and the public has come to expect this type of coverage. Tabloid media has generally been extremely critical of the Olympic development process, as they have tabbed it as just another way for the powerful to exploit the poor at their expense and rule the city how they see fit. Finally, the internet has allowed many smaller opposition groups to publicize their investigative findings and thoughts for all to see. Groups such as the Games Monitor have used the internet as a public forum, operating blog-style

websites designed to serve as oversight on the major decision makers and analyze their decisions (Games Monitor). This style of media coverage has allowed both top level actors and critics to publicize their interests, served to make the public more aware of the process and increased the pathways of influence available at all levels.

### **Other pathways of influence**

Although a variety of local interest groups and organizations have sought to gain access to the ODA and LOCOG, there are primarily two venues for these smaller interests to influence development. Businesses and organizations—such as local government—can either form partnerships with the Olympic committees, or if they oppose the goals then speak out in protest. On the environment and development front the ODA’s Sustainable Development Policy calls for inclusion as one of its main tenets. The original strategy was designed by the World Wildlife Fund and Bioregional—a British environmental construction and consulting firm—and called for “One Planet Living”. Since that time, however, many organizations feel the ODA has not allowed access for many partnerships. Organizations such as the London Sustainability Exchange, a network of groups in the capital dedicated to those ideals, have promoted meetings and conferences to spur communication, but many pathways remain closed. The ODA’s inclusion strategy prominently features many of the organizations it has collaborated with, but most of them have close ties with the government or are under the oversight of board members. These include LOCOG, the GLA, DCMS, the LDA, TfL, LTGDC, and the Environment Agency. Other interest groups are focused on construction or jobs, including JobCentre Plus, Business Link, the Learning and Skills Council, Strategic Forum for Construction,

Construction Products Association, and the Building Research Assessment. Several land use and environmental groups are included: Natural England and the Lea Valley Regional Park Authority. In addition, the sustainable development policy demonstrates an overlap with the five major impacted boroughs: Greenwich, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest (ODA Sustainable Development Strategy). Clearly the major pathway for local interest groups remains going through the ODA, and affecting development in this manner. The opposite pathway, if actors oppose the goals of these organizations, is to protest. The media has been receptive to covering opposition to the Olympic Park development, which has particularly focused on the power of government to forcibly purchase land from businesses and individuals if required for the project. This pathway is certainly still available, but at this point this is the main instance in which it has been used. The protest groups, however, did not force the ODA to change their overall policy.

**Table 13: London's Olympic Park Pathways of Influence**

<b>LOCOG/ ODA</b>	-Power to appoint and access top level political/ business/ sports actors -Power to purchase land and implement development plans
<b>Ken Livingstone</b>	-Ability to control Mayor's office government machinery -Presence on the Olympic oversight board
<b>Media</b>	-Exposure of scandals and political dealings through traditional tabloid-style journalism -Unprecedented facilities and access to covering the Games
<b>Interest groups</b>	-Accessing support for environmental and social goals in top-level organizations -Public protests that gain media attention

## **Analysis of Criteria**

The purpose of this section is to directly compare the data I have gathered on the planning and execution of the London Olympic Park, falling under the four criteria, with the predictions made by each political theory. Similar to the organization of the data section above, I go through each criterion in order and explain which theory or combination of theories best explains that process or outcome. Comparison with the results of Millennium Park's analysis is left mostly for the final chapter.

## **Dominant Actors/Concentration of Power**

The planning and execution for the East London Olympic Park have had a variety of dominant actors at different stages of the process. Overall, however, power has been concentrated among a small group of elite actors from business and government. Elite theory and regime theory provide the best explanation for the dominant actors and concentration of power throughout the process. Regime theory provides the better fit, however. According to elite theory, one or a few individuals are able to shape the outcome of an event in a specific direction based on personal goals or objectives. Although they may incorporate other actors, they are merely using these other people as a way to control the process and achieve their singular goal. In the Olympic Park process, there was no individual or small group that was able to control the entire process in such a manner. Both groups of dominant actors had divergent goals, and were forced to form political alliances in order to achieve them. No individual had the power to shape the entire process to fulfill their own objectives, it was a combination of Livingstone and the Olympic Committees.

Regime theory fits perfectly with this coming together to fulfill mutually beneficial goals. The coalition, as predicted by regime theory, included top actors from government—Tony Blair, Tessa Jowell, and Ken Livingstone—business—George Allen and Barbara Cassani—and culture (sports)—Seb Coe and Alan Pascoe. This coalition was working towards personal and collective goals, including other elite actors from NGOs, government, business, or sport when they had significant input to add. Pluralist theory provides some additional explanatory power because of this feature—other actors were allowed to influence the process in their areas of expertise—particularly on environmental and sustainability issues. Also local governments and local organizations had some say in the process, although not a loud one. Overall, however, these groups were not part of the main decision-making bodies. Growth machine theory also applies, as the coalition included top government officials and media executives. Dominant actors often made the argument that this would benefit the construction industry in the UK, thus gaining typical growth machine support. However, these groups were not strongly represented among dominant actors. Finally, electoral theory helps explain the outcome, as the original impetus, money, and support, as well as many main players came from the public sector. The presence of these government officials in top levels of the project and their willingness to pay millions in public money, as well as frequent public opinion and support initiatives, show their desire to use this project for political purposes. However, this is refuted by the abundant public criticism that has come with the project, and the controversial expenditure of public money could alienate some voters.

## **Primary Goals**

The primary goals of this Olympic Park coalition point towards growth machine theory as the central strategy for this type of economic development. According to growth machine theory, the prime objective of government and business is to maximize the economic value of urban land. The choice of East London as the Olympic Park site reflects this goal, as although they had slightly different perspectives, both Livingstone and the Olympic committees saw the potential for housing, transportation, construction, and employment benefits to be greater there than any other place in the city. This site was identified by the London Plan as one of the most economically disadvantaged in the city, and public officials have used economic benefits, derived from planning studies, as one of the main ways to obtain support across the UK for this project. Studies show the Olympic Park has the potential for massive economic development, making their claims ring true. The composition of the Olympic Committees, however, points more towards regime or elite theory to explain the primary goals of this project. Although they want to promote economic development, they have not attempted to concentrate power among real estate or construction interests or maintain the leadership of their urban regime. To take this one step further, this style of issue-oriented urban development, with a particular coalition for this specific project, and no others, suggests a more pluralist system of government. This organization also has some access for neighborhood and interest groups, in addition to distributing the government's resources to the place of greatest need. In fitting with elite theory, however, they have executed these plans in large part because of their desire to leave a personal

legacy behind for London, as well as being known as the people who are responsible for regenerating East London. Livingstone especially appears to have this personal goal. The actors have personal agendas for the project, and it seems that although they profess access, it is not easily available. Regime theory predicts this style of urban politics, with the leaders creating a business-favorable environment and excluding opposition. Maintaining the regime, however, is also a major goal, since several actors have spoken about making this an example of sustainable, environmentally friendly development to the rest of the world. They have frequently spoken about this extending to other projects as well. Seeing all of the public support, but also major opposition in some cases, electoral theory provides a mixed explanation, since this is a huge, risky strategy to pursue. Overall, growth machine theory, elite theory, and regime theory provide the best explanations for the primary goals of this project. It is mainly intended for economic development, has personal objectives behind it, and also actors are concerned with maintaining their ability to pursue environmentally sound development.

### **Resources Used**

Tracking the resources used for the Olympic Park project to discern lessons about the politics behind urban development proves more difficult than other criteria. Once again regime theory and elite theory provide the strongest explanations, but pluralist theory also provides an intriguing explanation. Growth machine theory does not seem to explain the process in this case, as public funding is the primary source of expenditures, although actors have relied heavily on access to top-level political decision making power. Tony Blair and Ken Livingstone's support were both vital to

securing the bid, but this political resource power also points strongly to regime theory. In addition, regime theory predicts a large network of potential allies in government and business that can be called upon to provide resources. This is reflected in the large and diverse memberships of the LOCOG and ODA boards. Both organizations have people from a wide range of sectors on their boards, providing access to a variety of networks and organizations. The top level decision makers also have control of the machinery of city government, allowing them to divert money to bodies such as the London Development Agency to achieve objectives. This harnessing of all means necessary also points to elite theory as an explanatory mechanism. In addition, Sebastian Coe and Ken Livingstone relied heavily on their personal reputations in order to succeed in delivering the Games and making it sustainable. First of all, Coe is a multiple time Olympic gold medal winning middle distance runner, and one of Britain's greatest sporting heroes of all time. His presence at the top of the bid process is credited by many with securing victory. Finally, Livingstone has a personal reputation for positive and innovative environmental policies, so he was able to convince critics that the Games would indeed leave behind a sustainable development. Electoral theory contributes little in this case, as there were no major party affiliations or donor networks drawn upon for the park. Pluralist theory, however, does help explain the outcome, as the Olympic Park leaders called on all of London's citizens to support and provide legitimacy for the bid process. In a way the public funding represents the pooled economic will of all the UK's citizens, and their support, including a few key neighborhood and local actors, shows that it was not just a regime-driven, elitist effort.

## **Pathways of Influence**

For the last criterion, regime theory and elite theory once again provide the most compelling explanations of the Olympic Park process. The entire process relied heavily on access to the machinery of government at the highest levels, from the London Plan to the original funding decision by the national government to the subsequent support from Livingstone at the Mayor's Office. Other city government agencies such as the LDA are providing major support and funding for the project, as well as local boroughs. Access to elite media institutions has also been key, as several top executives at prominent media corporations are serving on boards and helping out with the Olympic process. The British media, however, is notoriously harsh on all politicians, particularly when spending large amounts of money, with the Olympic Park being no exception. Above all this regime has access to the government, financing, and media necessary to make the project happen. Elite theory provides some explanation, as this has truly become an international media event, as occurs with every Olympic Games. It is seen by the top actors and media officials as a chance to promote London, and their status as a city leader, to the rest of the world. The Olympic Park is in large part an attempt to introduce a unique, environmental type of urban development to the world. In addition, fitting with elite theory, all of the top actors are drawn from the highest levels of their field, although power is not concentrated among a select few. There are diverse goals requiring diverse pathways, all of which the group has accessed. Electoral theory also explains many of the pathways of influence, as the Olympic Bill set up the relevant planning organizations, and the government was able to appoint people to the boards who fit with their goals.

In addition, these organizations have distributed public funds as they saw fit. Overall, however, they have operated outside the direct control of the government, making electoral theory an imperfect theory to explain this process. Growth machine theory also provides several key points, including the ability to purchase all of the land needed for the project and kick people out of their homes and businesses in the name of economic development. In addition, the top actors are able to access major planning boards and organizations to carry out their motives. Finally, pluralism is reflected in the intense media scrutiny of the project, although this is mainly a function of the traditional British role for tabloid journalism. Neighborhood and interest groups have found it exceedingly difficult to gain access to the decision making boards and organizations, refuting pluralism as an explanatory theory.

### **Overall**

Overall, although all theories provide some compelling explanatory power to the Olympic Park outcome as a tool for major economic development, regime theory and elite theory provide the strongest voices. The process is characterized by a mostly self-contained group of top individuals in their relevant fields, from government, business, and sport, led by a powerful Mayor. Overall these individuals have worked together to secure the somewhat shared goals of bringing the Olympics to London and redeveloping East London. This introduces a degree of growth machine and pluralism into the synthesis explanation, as the primary goals of the group were both economic development and leveling the playing field for all London residents, as well as social benefits. In addition, a major goal was to establish this as a new mode of urban development that will be continued in London's future and

serve as a signal to the rest of the world. The success of this development relied heavily on the presence of a dedicated, connected elite regime, with a strong Mayor as the head, committed to the environment and not increased access, only when they desired input. Overall this outcome is partly a product of changing attitudes among people, but mostly attitudes among elite actors that the best use of the city's land, and the Olympic Park, are to leave behind an environmental and economic legacy. These attitudes are governed and overseen in the development process by a dominant power and an urban regime committed to improving urban quality of life in London.

**Table 14: London's Olympic Park Best Explanatory Theories**

<b>Dominant Actors/ Concentration of Power</b>		<b>Primary Goals</b>	<b>Resources Used</b>	<b>Pathways of Influence</b>
1)	Regime theory	Growth machine theory	Regime theory	Regime theory
2)	Elite theory	Regime theory	Elite theory	Elite theory
3)	Growth/pluralist/ electoral theory	Elite theory	Pluralist theory	Electoral theory

## **Chapter Five: Comparison and Conclusion**

Although both case studies on their own shed light on the political process behind major urban parks development projects in the last few years, comparing and contrasting them illustrates which trends are the product of local dynamics and which are the product of broader forces. In addition, I base my comparison on a review of the most effective political theory explanations for each case as well as the four criteria of my framework. Through this analysis, I contribute to a comprehensive theory of urban politics that explains these park developments and other green initiatives. In order to achieve this goal I reconsider my original hypothesis that the city as a growth machine theory explains both developments. Finally, I fit my research into the broader context of urban development trends that other authors have observed and explain how my political analysis contributes to the growing body of knowledge about the changing nature of urban economics, government, culture, and society. I also suggest several directions for future study and research.

### **Comparison of Case Studies**

Millennium Park and the London Olympic Park each were shaped by many important city and project-specific factors, making it challenging to compare their politics. Despite this fact, there is still great potential for insight from comparing and contrasting the political outcomes, based on my four criteria. On the surface London and Chicago appear distinct cities in terms of size, importance in the global economy, history, and ethnic composition. However, similarities in the urban development process reveal that common characteristics exist between the politics and government of both cities. Drawing on these case studies, it is possible to begin formulating a

comprehensive theory that explains why parks were the preferred method for major urban development in Chicago and London. Both cases question the idea of the city as a growth machine and support current research that places emphasis on cities as “entertainment machines” whose most important role is to deliver amenities, in the form of environmental or quality of life improvements (Clark 2003). They also fit with the popular media view of “green cities” as taking the lead on environmental issues. In order to provide sufficient background, I first compare the overall parks and politics, followed by a comparison of cases based on my evaluation matrix outlined in chapter two. Applying this matrix highlights similarities and differences between the political outcomes of Millennium Park and London’s Olympic Park.

**Table 15: Overall Description of Political Process**

	<b>Dominant Actors</b>	<b>Primary Goals</b>	<b>Resources Used</b>	<b>Pathways of Influence</b>
<b>Millennium Park</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Power concentrated with a few dominant actors.</li> <li>-Elites from top levels of politics and all areas of business.</li> <li>-Secondary actors under sphere of influence of Daley or Bryan.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Furthering personal objectives and leaving a favorable legacy.</li> <li>-Gaining political support.</li> <li>-Promoting local economic development.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Access to top level political decision making power.</li> <li>-Extensive donor network.</li> <li>-Strong reputation and charisma.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Promotion of goals in international media.</li> <li>-Ability to access machinery of government for funding and support.</li> <li>-Making any alliances necessary, including for financing of major cultural projects.</li> </ul>
<b>London’s Olympic Park</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Power relatively dispersed among multiple governing organizations.</li> <li>-Political/ business/ sport elites.</li> <li>-Secondary actors under sphere of influence of Livingstone/LOCOG/ODA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Economic development in a poor area of London.</li> <li>-Greater social equality in London.</li> <li>-Serving as an environmental example to the world.</li> <li>-Putting on the best Olympics.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Access to top level political decision making power.</li> <li>-Public funding from national government.</li> <li>-Support from London’s citizens.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Promotion of goals in international media.</li> <li>-Ability to purchase land and use development money as needed.</li> <li>-Appointing officials and actors on Olympic boards.</li> </ul>

### **Millennium Park v. London’s Olympic Park**

Although Millennium Park has many extra cultural features and London’s Olympic Park has athletic venues, the motivation behind these adornments remains

the same as traditional parks—to bring together people from different backgrounds in an outdoor environment. They both have open space at the heart of their plans, but each has an important extra dimension. Millennium Park has its sculptures, sophisticated landscaping, Gehry bandshell, and theatre; it has become a cultural attraction as much as a park. London's Olympic Park, on the other hand, includes a major stadium and built recreation facilities. As far as location, Millennium Park is right in the heart of Chicago's business and cultural district, distant from many of the city's residents—especially the economically disadvantaged—but in an area with a booming population and real estate industry. The Olympic Park, on the other hand, is distant from the current business and cultural infrastructure in the heart of London, and will be most accessible to the poor residents who live in surrounding neighborhoods. The locations—although partly based on availability—are related to the goals of the project, and will be addressed further in that section. Finally, while Millennium Park takes up a few city blocks, London's Olympic Park is a several-hundred acre undertaking. In addition, while the scale of Millennium Park's cost is still on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars, the Olympic Park stretches into the billions. However, both represent a similar magnitude of development: the most important and expensive undertaking in the past several decades.

### **Comparing Political Structures**

Two key issues to compare in the study of these parks are government structure and the role of mayors. Clearly the political process in each case is not only a product of individual actors and forces, but also the structure of government. Chicago's City Council operates very independently from the state and national

government, although at times the city has received funding for major development projects. The Council has authority as Chicago's main legislative body, and Mayor Daley must work with them to some extent even though he holds an enormous amount of power. Administrative services have been conducted on a citywide scale and this same government structure has been in place for the recent past. There are also a variety of quasi-governmental planning authorities involved in development, although they had little influence in the case of Millennium Park. In London the government structure is still evolving. The Greater London Authority (GLA)—the new London government headed by Ken Livingstone—seems like a potential long-term solution, with authority over many city-wide public services, but a huge amount of power and money still comes from national government. The GLA, however, does have access to and authority over several planning organizations such as the London Development Agency (LDA). In addition, semi-autonomous borough governments also hold some power over the most local public services. The difference between government structures in Chicago and London is one constraint on urban development outcomes.

### **Two Strong Mayors: Daley and Livingstone**

One major similarity between London and Chicago is that each has a powerful mayor that has shown a commitment to sustainability and green ideals outside of just these parks projects. Livingstone's Congestion Charging scheme was revolutionary for an urban area, forcing drivers to pay a fee each time they entered the central city in order to offset the cost of their carbon emissions. He has made combating global warming one of the main goals of his administration, and has used public

transportation to achieve this goal. Daley, on the other hand, has used land use changes to promote his status as a “green mayor”. His green roof campaign in Chicago has aimed to reduce the heat island effect of living in an urban area, and has even covered the roof of City Hall in grass. Both mayors have received international notoriety for promoting these goals, and although they have derived some political gain, both Daley and Livingstone are personally committed to green projects. They have also both been major political figures in their cities for several decades, gaining many allies as well as opponents over the years. In addition, both are extremely independent, proposing and executing controversial projects in the face of government, and even public, opposition. This has gained them trust among voters that they pursue projects not solely for political objectives, but for the good of their city. They have been gaining popularity over the years, demonstrating that this leadership styles is effective and well respected. In contrast, Daley has been in power for a long period of time, while Livingstone has only recently taken over the reigns of London’s new government. These similarities between mayors are important to recognize when analyzing the political process behind these park projects.

### **Description of Criteria**

In the next four sections I compare how the political processes behind Millennium Park and London’s Olympic Park played out for each of my four criteria. I focus on identifying common characteristics as well as differences between the parks, once again using growth machine, pluralist, regime, elite, and electoral theory as lenses through which to view these political outcomes.

### **Criterion 1: Dominant Actors/Concentration of Power**

This criterion captures the main driving forces behind each project, and seeks to describe who has the defining vision and decision making power. It is important because although each project had many actors, analyzing the process revealed that they fell under the guidance of concentrated leadership. Overall Chicago had fewer dominant actors and a more concentrated power structure than London, but both processes were similar in that all important actors came from the highest levels of politics, business, culture, or sport. In addition, both had two sets of secondary actors, most of which fell under the influence of the major dominant actors. Chicago's dominant actors, Mayor Richard Daley and John Bryan, had different personal objectives for the Millennium Park project. These two elites came together because they needed each other, not because they had a distinct shared interest. In London, however, there was a broader coalition that included more actors but also had more overlap between their goals. Overall the coalition came together for the same reason as Chicago, to support each other's personal goals and fully control the decision making process.

London is much broader urban regime, while Chicago's regime was composed of only a few elite actors. Growth machine theory provides an inadequate explanation of dominant actor coalitions in both cases because the leading members did not come from the classic real estate or development sectors. My observations do not fit with the predictions of pluralist theory either, because dominant actors limited and controlled the influence of secondary actors and interest groups. Comparing the political leadership, neither project had strong political party influence, but both had

mayors as dominant figures who staked their political futures on the success of these projects. Being a central figure in these major open space urban developments helped both Daley and Livingstone win another term since they were completed or began. Overall in both cases there was a strong regime of elite actors—Chicago’s more narrow and London’s broader—who drove these projects, led by a powerful mayor concerned in part with promoting their reputation and electoral status.

### **Criterion 2: Primary Goals**

The primary goals criterion includes the motivations of major actors for undertaking these specific projects as well as the observed outcomes. Both these aspects help identify the interaction between different actors and the success of the projects. Using urban political theory to explain the primary goals behind these two projects produces different outcomes. Elite theory and electoral theory provide the best explanations for the goals of Millennium Park’s leaders, while growth machine and pluralist theory best explain the goals behind London’s Olympic Park. John Bryan and Richard Daley sought to promote their personal objectives. The former wanted to design a world class arts facility as well as provide a gift to all of Chicago’s citizens, while the latter sought to preserve his political reputation and promote central loop development. In contrast, London’s top actors had more shared goals, centered on major economic development and social benefits for East London. However, the Olympic committees also had the broader goals of staging the best Games and promoting the entire UK economy, while Livingstone used the project to further his personal political status in a similar way to Daley.

Therefore, electoral theory provides a strong explanation for the “green mayor” and “builder mayor” reputation goals of both mayors, improving their chances to maintain a position of power. Growth machine theory provides stronger support for the economic re-development of a poor area goal of London’s Olympic Park. However, Mayor Daley’s goal of creating an inter-modal transportation site and the explosion of housing and development in the central Loop resonates with the goals of a growth machine. The social goals of London’s Olympic Park coincide well with pluralism, as does John Bryan’s objective to give all the people of Chicago a gift at the Millennium. However, in Chicago the economic development outcomes have overwhelmed the social. Regime theory provides a weak explanation for the goals of both projects, as neither group sought to maintain its leadership over a long period of time. Elite theory provides a strong explanation of Bryan’s objective of providing the best arts and culture, and working with other elites, but it does not apply to London. Overall, the application of my five political theory lenses to the primary goals of Chicago and London reveals that the actors involved have moved well beyond the growth machine goals in both cases. In both cases the primary goals are shaped by the desire of an elite regime of actors to promote their interests, which have driven the nature of these open space development projects.

### **Criterion 3: Resources Used**

My third criterion, resources used, seeks to illuminate both the financial backing behind these projects as well as other resources that provided power for the project leaders. This is vital to understanding who was working behind the scenes in terms of economic or political support. A regime of elite actors accurately describes

the private funding, social networks, and political capital used in Millennium Park, although others are also significant. A regime of elite actors who have pluralist objectives provides the strongest explanation for the resources used by the leaders of London's Olympic Park. Although Mayor Daley and John Bryan relied on their reputations and positions of power, they were funded by a traditional urban regime composed of leaders from across the spectrum of business sectors. London's process reveals a similar urban regime, one that drew on political resources from actors at the top levels of business, government, and sport. In addition, both cities were able to access diverse government funding sources—TIF districts or the national government—in large part because of this diverse political backing.

Although Millennium Park received contributions from growth machine industries, and Daley has long relied on them for political support, the majority of gifts came from people devoted to philanthropy and the arts. In London as well the financial and political resources did not come disproportionately from specific sectors. Fitting with elite theory, in both cities actors were able to mobilize political and economic resources in large part because of these reputations as leaders in their fields. In addition, electoral theory explains Daley's resource use for Millennium Park, since many of his political donors overlap with those who gave money to support the project and stressed the use of no public funding. However, neither he nor any London actors relied heavily on a specific political party, as electoral theory would suggest. On the other hand, London has used nearly all public money, fitting with the predictions of pluralist theory over electoral. Also fitting with pluralist theory, the London regime relied heavily on a wide base of support from all citizens

and involved environmental groups in the planning process. Overall, regime theory and elite theory provide the best explanation for the economic, political, and social resources used in Chicago and London. In the case of London this elite regime relied on the tools of pluralist governments—public support and funding—while in Chicago the regime relied on resources from its own elite members.

#### **Criterion 4: Pathways of Influence**

This final criterion seeks to capture the exact mechanisms by which leaders made their projects happen, but also the potential for media and other outside influence. It is vital to understand how project leaders promoted their goals, as well as the perception of the projects among society. The regime of elite actors in Chicago and London relied on access to diverse funding sources and the ability to concentrate power as their primary pathways of influence in these park projects. Regime theory explains the access to political decision-makers and ability to access a variety of funding sources—using the full machinery of government—in both cases. However, the media was very critical of both projects, so regime theory is not a perfect fit. Elite theory also helps explain the different pathways of influence. Not only were most of the actors drawn from the top levels of business and government, but they also used any means necessary to achieve their goals. This included only allowing the influence of secondary actors when they would be beneficial to the project. In addition, a key indicator of elite theory, major actors in both cases used their reputations to boost the status of the projects in the international arena. London's Olympic bid took off when Blair, Livingstone, and Coe began promoting it on the international stage.

Growth machine theory provides a much better explanation for London's process than Millennium Park, since Daley operated outside the sphere of major planning boards and organizations. On the other hand, London's Olympic Park not only required compulsory purchasing, but also used major planning organizations such as the LDA to channel funding. Electoral theory provides significant support in both cases, although more strongly in London than in Chicago. The passage of the Olympic Bill through the national government would not have occurred as easily as it did without electoral support for the project, and Daley could not have used TIF funding without his position as Mayor. However, in neither case did political parties play roles as pathways of influence. Pluralist theory is not reflected much in either project, although both displayed intense media scrutiny. Once again a regime of elite actors provides the strongest explanation for the pathways of influence used in both Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park.

### **Growth machines, or another theory?**

When viewing my four core elements of dominant actors, primary goals, resources used, and pathways of influence through the lens of urban political theory, it is clear that no existing theory provides a comprehensive explanation. This is not surprising or disappointing, as I am not testing the individual theories but using them as analytical lenses to understand the development process. My case studies reveal growth machine theory is inadequate to describe the politics behind park development in Chicago or London, a divergence from my original hypothesis. However, this does not mean that elements of the growth machine are completely absent from these projects. Nor does it mean that any of the other major political theories provide a

complete explanation for the outcomes. I have ranked all theories to help determine which ones best fit my criteria for both case studies. I have ranked each theory from 1 to 5 for each criterion, with a 1 meaning that it provides the worst explanation of the political outcome, and a 5 the best. I have also calculated means for each theory and an overall mean to determine which one provides the best comprehensive explanation. Deviation and sensitivity are also important since some theories are very strong in some areas and weak in others.

**Table 16: Ranking Theories**

	<b>Dominant Actors/ Concentration of Power</b>	<b>Primary Goals</b>	<b>Resources Used</b>	<b>Pathways for Influence</b>	<b>Average</b>
<b>Growth Machine Theory</b>	Chicago: 2 London: 1	Chicago: 3 London: 5	Chicago: 3 London: 1	Chicago: 2 London: 3	C: 2.5 L: 2.5 Overall: 2.5
<b>Pluralist Theory</b>	Chicago: 1 London: 2	Chicago: 3 London: 4	Chicago: 1 London: 3	Chicago: 1 London: 2	C: 1.5 L: 2.75 Overall: 2.12
<b>Regime Theory</b>	Chicago: 4 London: 5	Chicago: 1 London: 1	Chicago: 4 London: 5	Chicago: 5 London: 5	C: 3.5 L: 4 O: 3.75
<b>Elite Theory</b>	Chicago: 5 London: 4	Chicago: 5 London: 2	Chicago: 5 London: 4	Chicago: 4 London: 4	C: 4.75 L: 3.5 Overall: 4.12
<b>Electoral Theory</b>	Chicago: 3 London: 3	Chicago: 2 London: 3	Chicago: 2 London: 2	Chicago: 3 London: 1	C: 2.5 L: 2.25 Overall: 2.37

Elite theory provides by far the best description of major urban parks development in Chicago, while regime theory also rank highly. Electoral theory helps explain dominant actors and pathways of influence, and its application raises questions about changes in urban politics. Growth machine theory provides a good explanation only for the resources used, and pluralist provides an average explanation only for the primary goals. For London the situation is more mixed. Overall regime theory and elite theory both rank highly and provide the best explanation for this political

outcome across all four criteria. Growth machine theory, pluralist theory, and electoral theory all help for certain criteria as well, particularly the primary goals of the project. In the overall category, elite and regime theory provide the best fit. Electoral, growth machine, and pluralist theory rank the lowest, but they also deserve close inspection. Looking at each criterion separately, regime and elite theory provide the best explanation for dominant actors/concentration of power, resources used, and pathways of influence, while growth machine and pluralist theory are the best for primary goals. Overall, this ranking this ranking reveals that no single theory provides a comprehensive description of the political outcomes in Chicago or London. The ranking also supports my previous assertion that a regime of elite actors dominated the political process for both parks, promoting traditional growth goals as well as environmental and social objectives.

### **Conclusions from these data**

Although many conclusions can be drawn from the fascinating political processes surrounding Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park, I have chosen to focus on four that have become clear from the application of my urban political theory framework.

- 1) Although it is tempting to believe that these open space development projects reflect a pluralist trend—since environmental and community groups traditionally favor these projects—this is not the case in Chicago or London.
- 2) Overall, the political process behind these projects reveals that growth machines do not dominate the government in Chicago and London, but the

actors still draw on many of the same resources and pursue the same goals that growth machine theory emphasizes.

- 3) Above all, both projects reveal the domination of elite actors in the political process behind major development projects in Chicago and London, and the concentration of power in the hands of a few actors. However, although it still remains to be seen, these regimes have not yet extended to other projects or urban issues besides open space and development.
- 4) The presence of strong, charismatic Mayors who dominated both projects and have many similarities in their attitudes and governance styles reveals changes in the nature of urban electoral politics in Chicago and London.

### **1: Open space does not equal pluralism**

One of my expectations before conducting this study, based on previous literature as well as knowledge about Chicago and London, is that the politics behind these parks would reflect a trend away from the dominance of growth machines and towards a more pluralist style of government. Parks are a type of green amenity typically seen as small-scale community development projects proposed by local environmental organizations. In other cities around the world, large scale parks have been traditionally seen as the great equalizer: places where people from all classes can come together and enjoy a peaceful day even in the center of the city. Central Park in New York City is a prototypical example of this type. However, both are envisioned as community and environmental spaces, not tools of the growth machine.

Although Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park incorporate pluralist ideals in their expressed *goals*—similar to the goals of past wealthy elites in creating

parks—none of the other criteria reveal the presence of a pluralist development process. In London some groups had influence during the planning stages, but they have been largely left out after the bid was won, and used only when they supported regime goals. In Chicago, Mayor Daley and John Bryan had control over the entire project, from conception to finished product, not needing or receiving extensive input from these groups. Overall, three forces were responsible for this in Chicago and London: strategic location choices, the interests of community/environmental groups aligned with those of elite actors, and limited channels for access from these outside groups. Millennium Park was located in a historically non-residential neighborhood on an old railroad site, a site choice that limited opposition since no vocal community groups existed and everybody wanted to see the site improved. London's Olympic Park was also strategically located to minimize opposition, a place in such dire need of clean up and redevelopment that local groups allowed the project to proceed with limited input on their behalf. In addition, the dedication of elite actors to promoting environmental goals and sustainable development in both cities reduced the desire or need for interest groups to oppose or seek input for the projects. Finally, although the extensive media criticism shows the potential for protests to be heard, desire for greater access in London reflects the lack of open channels for outside group input. In both cases, these three strategic preferences by the elite actors—location, pro-environment, and tight control—produced open space, environment-friendly development that was not the product of a contentious, pluralist political process.

## **2: Growth machines not dominant, but goals and resources present**

In addition to pluralist tendencies, I also predicted these projects would reflect the continuation of the classic urban growth machine. This alliance of developers, newspapers, real estate, banks and construction interests has come together before in Chicago, London, and many other cities, and for years was thought to be the dominant force in urban politics. In the case of parks development in Chicago and London, however, the dominant actors/concentration of power and pathways of influence were different from those traditionally used by the growth machine. Real estate and construction interests did not work directly with elite political actors to push these projects, city planning departments and officials were not heavily involved, and newspapers generally criticized for both London's Olympic Park and Millennium Park. However, both projects had economic development either as a primary goal—redeveloping east London—or a major outcome—drawing tourists and residents into Chicago's central loop. In addition, many of Mayor Daley's financial backers, as well as those who politically and financially supported both projects, coincide with growth machine industries. In London the expected boost for the construction industry was used to make a case for the benefits of the project to the whole UK. Therefore, although Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park are not the products of Molotch's (1976) traditional growth machine, there is still evidence in both cases for growth machine goals and support from growth machine actors. This evidence supports one major conclusion: anti-growth and pro-environment/culture goals in Chicago and London have become more widespread among the city's most powerful actors, and have forced elite decision makers to seek new ways to combine

growing social/environmental goals and economic goals. For Daley and Livingstone, Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park reflect unique ways to achieve growth goals, and tap into those resources, while also working with other powerful actors whose goals have shifted. Traditional growth machine coalitions did not operate in either of my case studies, although some of their goals and resources remained evident.

### **3: Elite and regime theory best explain both projects**

Instead of pluralist or growth machine theory, combining elite and regime theory provides the best explanation for the political outcomes of Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park. The dominant actors, primary goals, resources, and pathways of influence used by both projects are characteristic of elite regimes. In Chicago elite actors Daley and Bryan were supported by a funding regime comprised of leaders from a variety of business and cultural spheres who have worked together on previous projects. In London there was a larger regime that was also composed of elite actors with personal goals, but with more evenly distributed power and the combined goal of redeveloping East London. However, unlike in Chicago, the London actors have not worked together on previous projects and it seems like the Olympics were a unique opportunity for this regime of elites to come together. This domination of urban elite regimes in the political process behind parks development reveals that in Chicago and London these actors have a preference for combining environmental/sustainable ideals with economic goals. Although these parks are a form of growth, these urban regimes are not concerned only with creating infrastructure, increasing population, boosting the economy, and maintaining their

place at the top. In Chicago, with limited financial resources available to Mayor Daley, this elite cultural regime was dominant in development because he could not rely on government alone to provide money and support. He needed to seek out other actors who shared his goals for the city and the financial resources to support them. In London, Ken Livingstone realized that he needed to work with elite actors from the national government and private sector in order to harness the resources necessary to complete his sought-after environment-friendly redevelopment project. Although funding sources and the size of regimes differed, in both cases an elite urban regime of top-level actors from politics and business drove the parks development process.

#### **4: Dominant mayors representative of a trend in urban electoral politics**

In Chicago and London a dominant mayor exercised a degree of control over politics and development, but in neither case did they rely heavily on allies from their political party—mostly they sought out other elite actors. Both mayors pursued large-scale, internationally renowned, environmentally friendly development projects, no doubt with the goal of promoting their reputation and increasing support in their cities. They did not rely on party machinery to make these projects happen.

Livingstone and Daley have many similarities: charisma, global notoriety, independence, support of green ideals, and increasing electoral margins. Both of them, as well, have less of a connection to a political party than in the past.

Livingstone was a long time Labour Party leader and Daley came from a political tradition dominated by the Democratic Party. Livingstone, however, first became mayor as an independent candidate, and many researchers have observed that Chicago politics have strayed further and further from the Democratic political

machine. They argue that Daley has started to run more modern, independent campaigns and relied on a different electoral coalition than in the past (Simpson et al. 2004). Regardless of these larger trends, in my two urban development case studies political parties were not major actors. Daley and Livingstone used these major projects that thrust them onto the international stage, to promote their reputations for public buildings and improvement projects as well as environmental ideals. Coalition and regime building behind these projects occurred without regard to party affiliation. Electoral theory explains the use of these projects to promote re-election, but is too focused on political parties to provide a better fit. Both of my case studies showed evidence of a major environmentally friendly development project that succeeded because a strong, individual mayor with an international, signature reputation pursued their personal goals and did not rely on party machinery.

### **A new theory to account for these conclusions?**

These four conclusions reveal interesting things about the politics of urban parks development in Chicago and London, and my theoretical framework has shed light on how policy is made in these urban areas. These theories are not necessarily meant to provide a complete explanation for the political outcomes in an urban area; cities are so diverse and dynamic that it remains difficult to describe politics using only one theory. They can be used as tools to analyze urban politics, looking where their predictions fit an observed process and where they differ. Since the case studies of Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park share a distinct set of common characteristics that could be at work in other cities, drawing them together with a

comprehensive theory could help future researchers assess these changes as they relate to broader underlying trends in urban politics.

I propose a framework that describes the politics behind urban parks development in Chicago and London, a “Green Development Regime”. In many ways it is a combination of growth machine theory, regime theory, elite theory, and electoral theory, so it is not unique, but it accurately reflects the processes at work in my case studies. First of all, the actors involved in this regime are a powerful mayor and elite actors from business, government, and cultural sectors. The mayor is a dominant figure in all processes who has the power to direct the machinery of development and harness resources through the regime in order to carry out his goals. Most regime members are not drawn from “growth machine” industry rather they are elite members of society who want to improve the quality of urban life. Business and cultural leaders are committed to social, cultural, and environmental goals, and will only support a powerful, individual, dynamic mayor who is not heavily reliant on party politics. The city must also have the economic resources among its private citizens or government to complete such a large-scale development project.

Because municipal governments do not have adequate funds to carry out development projects, they must look to the private sector (in Chicago), or national government (in London). In these two post-industrial cities, this wealthy elite is more concerned with social and environmental goals than growth, so they tend to support projects and policy that fit these goals. In Chicago and London they support mayors who hold these ideals, have the power to maintain the regime, can gain support of the wider public, and can harness the full machinery of government. Some recent

literature has argued that the general population in urban areas such as Chicago is more concerned with urban amenities and quality of life than development (Clark 2003). The success of Daley and Livingstone seems to support this argument, which I will discuss later. In Chicago and London development is no longer the central objective of government. The theory below attempts to describe the politics of urban park development in Chicago and London based on my case studies.

**Table 17: Green Development Regime**

	<b>Dominant Actors/ Concentration of Power</b>	<b>Primary Goals</b>	<b>Resources Used</b>	<b>Pathways for Influence</b>
<b>Green Development Regime Theory</b>	-Powerful, charismatic, internationally known Mayor. -Elite actors from general business and cultural sectors who are concerned with urban quality of life.	-Create developments that boost the economy and improve quality of life. -Maintain dominance of urban regime and power of mayor.	-Private money from business, philanthropy and the full machinery of public funding. -Political capital from powerful allies. -Economic health and stability of city.	-Access to and trust of top-level decision-makers and urban power brokers, or being one themselves. --Passing laws and regulations that govern the city. -Extensive exposure of goals in local and national media.

This theoretical framework, which borrows from and extends previous theory, resonates with my conclusions and seeks to capture the key political processes and actors involved. This framework must be tested against outcomes in other cities to determine if it applies more broadly. Based on my case studies several conditions seem to be vital for a “Green Development Regime” to exist. Many of these conditions are outlined above, and the most important include general economic health, a post-industrial economy, the presence of an elite philanthropic community, a political culture that values urban amenities, and a government structure that allows for a strong mayor to drive the development process.

**How does this fit with recent urban development trends/extend to other cities?**

Similar trends have been observed by social scientists in urban areas over the past several decades. Two examples of related case studies are the “Urban

Sustainability Fix” in Manchester and Leeds, and the “City as an Entertainment Machine” idea described by Terry Nichols Clark in various American cities but particularly in Chicago. In addition, the popular media has also observed a broader trend towards “green cities” where strong mayors are driving urban environmental quality initiatives. The win-win combination of economic and environmental goals has driven cities to develop “brownfields” sites for many years. Although Millennium Park and London’s Olympic Park could simply be viewed as a large-scale version of this trend, these case studies reveal broader and more fundamental urban political trends at work.

In the study of Manchester and Leeds, While, Jonas, and Gibbs (2004) argue, “...the politics of urban development is becoming increasingly dependent on the ability of local political and economic elites to manage, if not necessarily resolve, ecological demands emanating from within and outside the urban area.” Essentially, they argue there are two pressures on urban governments in a post-industrial society: pressure to promote economic growth and development, similar to the growth machine theory, and pressure to clean up the brownfields, polluted air, and dirty water that industrialization left behind. The two forces combine to produce an entrepreneurial city constantly searching for ways to combine these goals to achieve their “sustainability fix”—defined as a policy solution that combines economic development and environmental quality improvement. Their arguments are supported by years of research in Manchester and Leeds, two post-industrial cities in the UK, but have not been tested in many other urban areas. These political and economic realities all contribute to, “changing modes of urban governance”, in which green

development is the most important outcome in post-industrial cities (While, Jonas, Andrew E. G., and Gibbs 2004).

These competing forces of environmental health and economic development could go a long way towards explaining the use of parks as major urban development projects in Chicago and London. However, my case studies included less influence from environmental interest groups and more control by elite actors. In addition, the authors studying Manchester and Leeds included all environmentally related policy initiatives, whereas I limited my study to open space development. The authors also point towards a more pluralist system of government as explaining this outcome, with the incorporation of environmental interest groups into a classic growth machine. In Chicago and London these actors are not directly involved in the political process, probably caused by city size or the presence of elite actors already committed to these ideals. The forces of environment and economy are the same in both cases, but the political structure is different. Comparing my theory and conclusions to recent policy outcomes in Manchester and Leeds would help determine the strength of this correlation.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, my conclusions fit with the trends of the “City as an Entertainment Machine” and the “New Political Culture” observed by Terry Nichols Clark in Chicago. The entertainment machine theory argues that the dominant goal in many post-industrial urban governments is delivering amenities and quality of life improvements to citizens. These take the form of recreational opportunities such as bike paths, cultural opportunities such as opera and museums, and commercial opportunities such as the presence of Starbucks or nice restaurants.

There is some chicken-or-egg debate about whether the residents or amenities—and economic growth—came first, but there is a growing body of literature arguing that these amenities are the driving force in post-industrial cities. In theory, since the economy in many cities—including Chicago and London—is increasingly service based, for a city to thrive it must attract the most dynamic, creative, and intelligent residents, who consequently place a high value on these amenities. Often times they also generate additional economic benefits in the form of tourism dollars. The desire to attract and keep these residents has led to competition between cities and the subsequent rise in amenities (Clark 2003).

In addition, intertwined with these socio-economic changes has been the “New Political Culture”, a change described by Clark in detail for Chicago. Its main arguments are: left-right dimensions have been transformed, social and fiscal issues have been separated, social issues have grown in importance, a union between market liberalism and social progressiveness has been created, and there has been an increase in issue politics and a decline of hierarchical political organizations (Clark and Hoffman-Martinot 1998). The last point is most significant to this study. Overall in Chicago, although Daley is sure never to forget his Democratic base, he has continued to shed the hierarchical machinery of government presided over by his father. He has become the socially liberal individual mayor that Clark predicts. These changes are reflected in his use of parks as a tool of development, and his complete control over the project. Livingstone has also presided over many of the trends put forth by the “City as an Entertainment Machine” and “New Political Culture” theories. Both Millennium Park and London’s Olympic Park are urban

amenities of the exact kind described by Clark, backed by regimes that in some ways resemble the growth machine coalitions from his study. In my case studies, urban amenities have left the small scale coffee shops and cycling paths and entered the realm of major development projects, competing with other cities to attract residents. Some of the political conclusions I observed in Chicago and London are related to Clark's "New Political Culture" theory. However, in the present cases the rising importance of social issues does not produce a more pluralist form of government. Instead, the environmental and cultural values in Chicago and London reside with elite residents, who use these ideals to support a friendly, dynamic, powerful mayor who also shares them. In addition, my case studies support the continued decrease in the importance of political parties in urban politics. Candidates are individuals.

The popular media has also picked up on the trend towards "green cities". Recently Newsweek profiled several of the most eco-friendly mayors in the United States, including Greg Nickels of Seattle. The article's authors saw this change in urban policy as both a response to growing concern about climate change as well as a response to the lack of action from the federal government (Underwood 2007). These initiatives not only include light-bulb exchanges intended to save money, but also trying to attract residents back into the city center to live in an effort to increase energy efficiency. Matthew Kahn's (2006) recent book *Green Cities: Urban Growth and the Environment* describes the interaction between economics, growth, and the environment in urban areas, looking for solutions to problems such as sprawl and low environmental health. These trends appear to fit with what I have observed in my case studies, and suggest that green initiatives are not restricted to development

projects. In the United States cities and states are often seen as laboratories of democracy to try new initiatives before they filter up to the national government. It will be interesting to see if these green trends percolate upward to national policy in the next several decades.

Overall my study confirms, qualifies, and modifies parts of these new trends in urban political theory literature. Seeing how these relationships are borne out in other urban areas will lead to a better understanding of how the political process behind urban development plays out on a global scale.

### **Implications**

These two case studies represent a distinct process of urban politics and open-space development project that has occurred recently in Chicago and London. In these cities, two of the world's most important financial centers, parks were used as tools of economic development. Analyzing the political process behind these parks demonstrates that pluralist and growth machine theory succeed only in part to explain these outcomes, while a regime of elite actors provides the most powerful explanation. In addition, the two mayors have become strong individuals much less reliant on political parties. I have developed a modified political theory that incorporates these four conclusions. In the cases of Millennium Park and London's Olympic Park, "Green Development Regimes" controlled the machinery of business, culture, and government to achieve their objectives.

The "Green Development Regime" theory represents a distinct set of features present in Chicago and London. Both cities are governed by independent mayors with international reputations, and have a business and cultural elite community

dedicated to using their financial, political, and social resources to improving urban quality of life. In addition, neither mayor is able to rely on municipal funding for development projects; they must turn to these elite actors who control private and national government funding. These actors form an elite regime that controls the development process through their use of economic and political power to promote shared and personal goals. Although Chicago and London are different in some respects, they share several common conditions such as a strong post-industrial economy and a history/political culture that values open space and progressive environmental policy that appear vital to the presence of this “Green Development Regime”. These features go well beyond the economic/environment overlap of brownfields development, and are consistent with the observations of recent urban development literature, and could be observed in many cities such as Boston, Seattle, San Francisco, and New York.

This study should encourage elite actors from business and government to work together on environmentally friendly development projects. For residents of cities, this means electing a powerful mayor who will be able to build alliances with leaders in the business and cultural sector. For policymakers it means structuring government to allow for collaboration and outside funding sources. However, some people would argue that these elite governing regimes could be spending their money in a lot more beneficial ways for the city, and interest groups should have greater access in our inherently pluralist system of government. Interest group leaders and residents must continue pressuring government to make sure funding is directed in the best interest of the city as a whole. In addition, policymakers may want to consider

further regulating public-private partnerships in urban development. Actors in urban areas not in the same post-industrial stage of development as Chicago and London could also draw lessons from these case studies about how to promote quality of life and environmental health in their cities.

Urban areas are the most important concentrations of human population that dominate both their environments and the environments of areas that supply them. With some cities growing rapidly, others declining, and others in between, it is important to understand how government functions and policy is made. Drawing lessons from post-industrial cities that are changing to work towards the goal of achieving sustainable development would be beneficial to citizens and policymakers seeking to promote these ideals.

### **Best directions for future study**

The most significant way to extend this research would be to analyze different cases in other urban areas. In addition, looking for the presence of the four trends I have observed in other cities will help determine if they are specific to Chicago and London or the product of broader international forces. It would be especially useful to look for their presence in cities at different stages of development or those that have much different cultures and histories, to determine if “Green Development” is a unique stage of post-industrial politics. Also, further studies could more explicitly define the urban conditions—especially economic—in which these regimes are present. Do they require the unequal growth and large income inequality produced by industrialization in Chicago and London? Can booming “mega-cities” harness this economic and political capital, or do these regimes require cities with a long history

of open space and aesthetic ideals (Lee 2007)? Major development projects provide excellent case studies to apply this theoretical framework, although they have been somewhat neglected in the literature. In particular, immense transportation projects such as the “Big Dig” in Boston would provide excellent political case studies, particularly since they have additional variables such as a large federal government role. In addition to looking at fast-growing (Phoenix, Las Vegas) or non-post industrial cities (China, India) in the US and abroad, analyzing politics in other post-industrial cities or those recently portrayed as eco-friendly would prove very useful. Looking at city politics in Turin, San Francisco, Seattle, or New York City would help reveal if these same processes are at work in other “green cities”. My theoretical framework could also be useful in future urban political analyses, especially of development projects, when an author wants to compare multiple theories. Overall, many questions of interest remain. Do “Green Development Regimes” control other cities as well? Are they unique to certain conditions or present in a diverse range of urban areas? How does this theory fit into the broader context of modern urban political theory trends? Further study can help shed light on these vital issues in modern urban politics.

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#### Meetings, Site Visits, Conferences London Summer 2006

- 2012: What's in it for us then? Creative Links EXPO. June 2006. London, UK.
- Beddington Zero Energy Development tour. June 2006. London, UK.
- London Plan early alterations. June 2006. London, UK.
- Mayor's Question Time. June 2006. London, UK.
- Mayor's Question Time. July 2006. London, UK.
- The Regeneration Debate, London Architecture Biennale. 2006. London, UK.
- Transport for London board meeting. June 2006. London, UK.
- London Sustainability Exchange. June 2006. London, UK.

Timothy Gilfoyle's unpublished interviews, deposited at Chicago History Museum

Michael Lasch (Director of Public Art, Chicago Department of Cultural Affairs). 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. February 21.

Lois Weisberg (Director of Special Events for Chicago). 2000. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. May 22.

George A. Ranney. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. March 7.

Randall Mehrberg. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. September 29.

Joan Harris. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. February 20.

John McDonough. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. February 12.

Donna LaPietra. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. March 12.

Robert Hutchinson. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. March 5.

Lawrence O. Booth. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. August 14.

Sandra Guthman. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. February 26.

Paul Gray. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. October 4.

Marshall Field V. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. March 7.

Richard Daley. 2003. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. August 28.

Ed Uhler. 2001. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. September 13.

Ed Uhler. 2004. Interview by Timothy Gilfoyle. Transcript. August 3.